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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
After remand from a summary judgment against him, Mark Van ("Mark" or "Van") now 
asks this Court to reverse a jury's determination that he was terminated by Portneuf Medical 
Center ("PMC") because his "inability to maintain positive interpersonal relations with his 
colleagues" and "foster a positive team environment" was endangering the Life Flight program. 
In 2005, Van filed claims for breach of contract and termination in violation of the Idaho 
Protection of Public Employees Act, Idaho Code Section 6-2101, et seq. (hereafter, 
"Whistleblower Act"). The district court granted summary judgment on both claims, finding that 
Van had "severe distrust issues with the pilots and was unable to accept solutions unless those 
solutions were his own suggestions" and this attitude led to "dysfunction within the Life Flight 
program." Memorandum Decision and Order of October 30,2007, at 14. As the prevailing 
party, PMC was awarded attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). R. 
Vol. I 2-4. On appeal, this Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the breach of 
contact claim, but remanded for further proceedings on the whistleblower claim. Van v. Portneuf 
Med. etr., 147 Idaho 552, 561, 212 P.3d 982,991 (2009). After five weeks of testimony the 
jury, like the district court, concluded that Van was not terminated for reporting suspected 
violations oflaw. R. Vol. III 531-32. Van now appeals, arguing that the jury was wrong and its 
determination that Van was terminated for his inability to work with others was not supported by 
substantial and credible evidence. 
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B. Statement of Facts. 
The PMC Life Flight team operated a helicopter ambulance service throughout southeast 
Idaho. The team members repeatedly put themselves at risk, landing anywhere necessary in 
order to rescue and save injured patients. Tr. Vol. 1607-08. "It is extremely difficult to do this 
job safely if everyone isn't on the same sheet of music .... The mechanics have got to be on ... 
board. The nurses, the paramedics, the pilots especially have to all be on board with this, and we 
have to have a cohesive unit that's willing to go out there ... make suggestions, bring up points 
that they're concerned about, and then we discuss them." Nielsen, pilot; Tr. Vol. 1608:2-10. In 
order to operate safely and effectively, it was crucial that all members of the team work together 
and communicate well. Tr. Vol. II 1048-51. Although the pilots, mechanics, and the flight 
nurses each had their own responsibilities, the team worked together to ensure safe and effective 
operations. For example, mechanics performed periodic maintenance and inspections on the 
helicopter, but the pilot had to ensure required maintenance had been performed prior to flying. 
Ex. 270, PMC00341-42. The flight crew helped the pilot watch for obstacles, wires or dangers, 
especially upon takeoff and landing, and assisted with preparing the aircraft for flight, refueling, 
etc. Tr. Vol. I 175; Tr. 1529; Tr. 1627-28. Pilots, in turn, followed the medical crew's directions 
regarding the flight path and altitude to provide the best care for their patients. Tr. 1613:6-25. 
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In 2005, the Life Flight team at PMC was lead by Pam Holmes', Program Director. She 
directly supervised the Director of Aviation, Gary Alzola, the Director of Maintenance, Mark 
Van, and the Chief Flight Nurse, Tom Mortimer. Tr. Vol. II 847:13-23. Alzola had primary 
responsibility for the pilots, including Ron Fergie, Barry Nielsen, Jim Ford, and Chad Waller. 
Van supervised the other mechanics, Greg Stoltz and David Perkins. Mortimer oversaw the 
operations of the medical crew, including the nurses and paramedics who flew on the helicopter, 
Mark Romero, Greg Vickers, and Lance Taysom. Van had been Director of Maintenance for 
Life Flight since 1986. Tr. 108:9-12. Throughout his employment, Van was regarded as a 
competent mechanic and the team trusted him to ensure the helicopter functioned properly. 
Tr. 1518:9-10, 1573:15-17; Tr. Vol. I 604:19-20. No one doubted he was committed to the 
safety of the Life Flight program. See Tr. 1683:4-7. Paradoxically, however, as Van's 
employment continued, his distrust of other members of the team and his inability to accept 
others' solutions to his concerns began to undermine the safety of the program. 
On April 1, 2005, Pam Humphrey received an e-mail from Tom Mortimer. Ex. 514. 
Mortimer wrote: 
I am pretty disturbed by what I am hearing. I think this ongoing battle between 
the pilots and the Mechanic is becoming a safety concern. I think this is a 
relationship that must involve trust and also must involve respect. I think there is 
absolutely none of either. As a member of the medical crew I and the rest of the 
crew put our trust in both ofthese groups on a daily basis and it is making me 
nervous. I also think this poses a threat to the cohesiveness of our team. I 
1 Pam Holmes was known as Pam Humphrey during some of the relevant events in this case. 
However, to avoid confusion, all further references will be to Pam Humphrey rather than Pam 
Holmes, consistent with the convention in Van's Appellate Brief. 
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see already the taking of sides and that is never a good sign. I know that none 
of this is news to you but I wonder if there is a resolution. I am willing to help in 
any way that I can, but I think something must be done. 
Ex. 514 (emphasis added). Attached to the e-mail was a letter, also written by Mortimer. 
During the March 24,2005 Leadership committee meeting Mark Van raised the 
issue of unresolved safety concerns and his feelings that safety issues are treated 
lightly in our program. I felt that his timing was inappropriate and that he 
purposefully attempted to discredit the pilots in front of the flight crew. I 
don't know what his specific issues were, but I do know that a large part of a 
successful flight program is trust. I also know that safety issues are taken 
seriously here and I trust the pilots and management of this program. I would 
hope that the parties involved would be able to work through this problem before 
it erodes our team any further. 
Ex. 515 (emphasis added). 
Something was done, as Mortimer requested, although Van, not Humphrey, got it started. 
At the end of March, Van spoke to Audrey Fletcher in Human Resources regarding an incident 
that had occurred on the helipad between him and Nielsen, one of the pilots. Tr. Vol. II 1119. 
She asked ifhe had told his manager, Humphrey. Id. He had, but was not satisfied with 
Humphrey's response. Id. He asked if Fletcher would facilitate a meeting between him and 
Nielsen. Id. Fletcher "was at the hospital to help departments heal and bond if there were issues 
or disagreements or anything that might be going on. It was her expertise to be able to bring 
those people together and work out their differences and build a cohesive team." Roberts, 
former Program Director; Tr. 674:22 - 675:2. Accordingly, Fletcher set up a meeting between 
Nielsen and Van to try to resolve these issues, which Humphrey and Alzola also attended. 
Tr. Vol. II 1119. 
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At the outset, the meeting addressed Van's report that Nielsen had acted aggressively 
toward him on the helipad in February 2005. Id. at 1120. Van claimed that Nielsen had told him 
he was sick of all the e-mails going around and that Van was putting the program into the 
crapper. When Van said he did not know what Nielsen was talking about, Nielsen replied, 
"You'll find out," which Van felt was threatening. Tr. 971 :23 972:3. Fletcher told Nielsen in 
no uncertain terms that his behavior was unacceptable, that he should not have confronted Van 
while he was angry, but should have walked away. Id. Nielsen apologized for his behavior and 
stated he had not intended to threaten Van. Ex. 294 ~ 23. Fletcher asked Van ifhe would accept 
Nielsen's apology; Van said he would have to think about it. Ex. 294 ~ 23. 
From there on, the "meeting started to go downhill really quickly, because all ofthe 
issues that we'd been dealing with for years before were raised again in that meeting. Mark 
mentioned again about this cover-up in the hospital of the media, of administration, of pilots. 
Not trusting pilots." Fletcher; Tr. Vol. II 1120:9-15. Van confronted Gary Alzola, yet again, 
with his (Alzola' s) statement to Van, in 2001 after the helicopter crash, that he would just have 
to accept any public perception that he might be at fault. See infra at 9-10, 28-31. Alzola again 
apologized. !d. at 1120:15-21. Fletcher asked Van, '''Can you let this go? Can you move 
forward? You know, trust is fundamental in a relationship.'" Id. at 1120:22-24. Van responded, 
"How do you trust somebody that's lied to you?" Id. at 1120:24-25. 
After the meeting, Fletcher realized that the problem was much bigger than she had 
originally thOUght. Id. at 1121. Recognizing there was a significant breakdown in trust within 
the Life Flight team, she asked her supervisor, Dale Mapes, to allow her to meet with other 
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members ofthe Life Flight program. Id. As she had done in other situations where there were 
complaints that the team was breaking down, see Tr. 1635-36, Fletcher interviewed the other 
members of the team to learn more about their concerns and the team dynamics. What she found 
lead her to conclude that in order to restore the function and trust in the Life Flight team, Van 
should be terminated. 
Fletcher interviewed Greg Stoltz and David Perkins, two of the Life Flight mechanics. 
She started by asking Stoltz about the October 2004 incident where there was ice on the 
helicopter blades. Ex. 582, PMCOOI253. Stoltz described the ice as "a light frosting on a 
windscreen that you would remove [with] blades" or about 1-2 millimeters thick.2 !d. Stoltz 
removed the ice from two blades and turned the other two into the sun. He then left the helipad 
to call Nielsen and left Nielsen a voicemailletting him know he was taking the helicopter out of 
service until the ice was off the blades. Id. In the 15-20 minutes Stoltz was away from the 
helipad, Nielsen arrived and, without listening to the voicemail, was taking off just as Stoltz 
returned to the helipad. Stoltz was concerned that the ice might not have had time to melt off 
and was somewhat upset Nielsen had not checked the voicemail, so he reported the incident to 
Van. Id. at PMCOOI254. Stoltz also reported the incident to Alzola and Fergie. Stoltz was 
treated well after the report, and he felt that everyone's behavior was appropriate. In his mind 
the issue was addressed, and the helicopter was always prepped for flight now, with pilots and 
2 Fletcher's notes say 1-2 centimeters (.45-.9 inches) thick, which would contradict the 
description of frost on a windshield. At hearing, she indicated that it should have been 
millimeters, not centimeters. Tr. Vol. I at 421: 17-25. 
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mechanics working together. Id. He felt that since the October incident, the "pilots are more 
conscientious about keeping the aircraft flightworthy." Id. at PMC001255. 
Stoltz noted that although a good mechanic and technician, Van was very hard-headed. 
Id. at PMC001255-56. He would not let go of issues and constantly referred to pilots "trying to 
get something by him." Id. He got upset when the pilots did not do what he wanted them to. 
Although Stoltz never observed any such behavior, Van repeatedly told him that pilots "gang up 
on him" and brush issues off to the side, and that Alzola protected pilots and did not act 
appropriately. Id. Stoltz admitted that Fergie and Nielsen were not as meticulous as the other 
pilots, but did not think they were unsafe. !d. Some of Van's concerns were legitimate, but 
Stoltz said others "are just Mark being Mark." Id. 
Perkins had not observed any safety problems in the six months he had been part of the 
team. Id. at PMC001257. He was not at PMC's Life Flight before November 2004, but during 
his tenure he felt the pilots were safe and used the rotor blade covers. Id. He noted, however, 
that the Life Flight team at PMC lacked the cohesiveness he had experienced at Columbia 
Helicopters, where he worked before PMC. Id. at PMC001258. When problems arose at 
Columbia, the mechanics and pilots worked to resolve them together. Id. That was not the case 
at Life Flight-there was no team spirit or effort and long-term issues festered between the pilots 
and mechanics. Id. He felt that Van had put up with doing operational jobs like de-icing rotor 
blades, that should be the pilots' job, not the mechanic's. Id. However, he felt that the ice on the 
blades in October was a minor issue that had been turned into a massive thing. !d. at 
PMC001259. If everyone had acted more professionally, in his opinion, it should never have 
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gotten out of hand. He stated the team had to be able to trust one another to work well together; 
to be able to raise issues, discuss them, and move on. Id. While the program was good, it was 
certainly not a friendly place to work. !d. at PMCOOI260. Neither Stoltz or Perkins reported 
they had problems if they raised safety issues, nor did they find the pilots hard to deal with. 
However, both saw the lack of trust and teamwork in the Life Flight team. 
Fletcher also spoke with Chad Waller, one of the pilots. He had no personal problems 
with Van and was friends with Van outside of work. However, he noted that Van's "behavior 
has caused [a] serious rift and is jeopardizing the program." Ex. 582, PMC001252. Waller 
noted that Van was unable to accept the adoption of safety measures that were not his own. Id. 
Waller feared that the constant focus on problems between pilots and mechanics created 
"potential for overlooking other issues." !d. 
The other pilots expressed similar concerns that the repeatedly resurrected issues were 
endangering the program. Id. at PMC001264. Alzola felt that he could no longer properly do his 
job due to stress and anxiety. !d. It had gotten to the point that staff were being asked to witness 
the pilots wiping off the rotor blades and people were always looking over their shoulders. Id. 
The pilots were double-checking and doubting themselves. Id. at PMCOOI265. The anxiety and 
constant watchfulness were a huge distraction. Id. at PMC001264. Van's behavior not only 
affected the pilots, but also outside vendors and the flight crew. Van's behavior had caused the 
Agusta representative (a helicopter vendor) to walk off the job in 2004. Id. The medical crew 
was also getting involved, commenting on e-mails in which Van claimed they were raising 
concerns that they had not actually raised. Id. at PMCOO 1265. The pilots felt that Stoltz and 
8 Client:2808598.1 
Perkins were good mechanics who built relationships with the pilots and kept them informed. Id. 
at PMCOOI266. Van believed that pilots did not need to know everything about the aircraft. Id. 
at PMCOOI265. Van's behavior was destroying the rapport that the pilots had with the rest of the 
team and undermining their ability to function effectively. See id. 
After speaking with the pilots and mechanics in the program, Fletcher also considered 
what she knew of past issues involving Van. Tr. Vol. II 1122. For several years, she had tried to 
resolve Van's concerns about the information released to the media after a serious accident. In 
November 2001, a Life Flight helicopter crashed, and pilot Tim Brulotte nearly lost his life. 
Brulotte had been in Salmon and had been having some issues with the helicopter's fuel system. 
After Brulotte determined it was safe to fly, he took off toward Idaho Falls, but was forced to 
land on the side ofthe road near Mud Lake due to problems with the fuel system. Tr. 212: 1-7. 
Van and his son drove to where the helicopter had landed, replaced the fuel filters, and verified 
the helicopter was safe to fly. Tr. 178-79. Soon after takeoff, Brulotte crashed into the hillside. 
Van and his son saw the resulting fire, drove to the crash site, removed Brulotte from the burning 
helicopter, and disconnected the battery to prevent additional fires. Tr. 180. Van was credited 
with saving Tim's life. Pam Humphrey nominated him for a hero award from the local 
community. Tr. Vol. II 852. Van was haunted by this event and became more concerned about 
safety. 
After the accident, the hospital released a statement that the helicopter had crashed after it 
had undergone maintenance in Salmon, and that the cause of the crash was under investigation. 
Tr. 212:10-13, 213:24 - 214:1. Van felt that details in the release were inaccurate. Tr. 211-12. 
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He thought people in the community believed he was responsible for the crash. Tr. 217. He 
wanted PMC to release infonnation indicating the pilot admitted it was pilot error. Van asked 
Fletcher in January 2002 about this, although he knew the hospital did not want to release 
infonnation until the investigation was complete. Tr. 216-17. He also asked Alzola to release 
the infonnation that Brulotte had admitted the crash was his error, but Alzola believed that 
regulations prohibited the release of infonnation to the media during the investigation. Tr. Vol. I 
21:14-17. 
Despite repeated meetings and discussions to resolve Van's concerns about the release of 
infonnation, little progress was made. Fletcher met with Van in August 2002 to try to resolve 
Van's concerns, but Van continued to believe the hospital deliberately chose not to release 
infonnation in order to blame him. Ex. 294 ,-r,-r 2-6. Van thought Alzola had lied about his belief 
that the FAA prohibited the release of infonnation during the investigation and was 
unsympathetic to Van's concern that the community might believe Van caused the crash. 
Ex. 296 ,-r,-r 6-7, Exs. A, B. 
In November 2002, Van refused to report to Alzola or have Alzola perfonn his 
perfonnance evaluation. Ex. 296, Ex. B; Ex. 294 ~ 7-11. Van thought someone was 
deliberately punishing him by making Alzola his supervisor, even though in most Life Flight 
programs the director of maintenance reports to the director of operations. Ex. 296, Ex. B; 
Ex. 582 PMC001265. After a meeting with Fletcher, Alzola and Van's supervisor, Diane Kirse, 
Van agreed to let Alzola do an initial evaluation with the agreement he could ask Kirse to do the 
evaluation ifhe was not satisfied. Ex. 294 ~ 4-11. A week later Van went to the CEO, Pat 
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Hermanson, demanding a change of the organizational structure so he would not report to 
Alzola. Id. ~ 12. Hermanson made the change, and thereafter Van reported to the program 
director. On November 15,2002, Fletcher had another discussion with Van about his concerns. 
Id. ~ l3. 
In February 2003, Van again brought his issues with Alzola to his current supervisor, 
Pam Humphrey's, attention. Ex. 296 ~ 7. Humphrey responded to his concerns in writing on 
February 6,2003, and held a meeting with Van, Cindy Richardson, VP of Patient Care Services, 
and Pam Niece, VP of Human Resources, on February 19,2003. Ex. 296 ~ 8, Ex. C. They 
discussed the need to move forward, accept management's decision on disciplining Alzola (or 
not), and continue working as part of the Life Flight team. Van indicated that he "would be able 
to work with Gary, as well as others, regardless of this decision." !d. After the meeting, it was 
management's "expectation that from this point forward the issue is closed for further 
discussion." Id. But another meeting was held in July 2003 with Human Resources to discuss 
the same issues linked to the 2001 crash. Again, Van was told that appropriate action had been 
taken and he needed to move on. Ex. 294 ~ 16-20; Ex. 244. In addition, the information release 
policy was being revised to respond to some of his concerns. Id. ~ 20. Yet another meeting was 
held on September 19, 2003, with Niece, Humphrey, and Van to discuss the same issues that 
were discussed in February. Ex. 296 ~ 9. Van responded to the summary of that September 
meeting in January 2004, refuting the content and asserting that he would continue to bring up 
these issues when he felt necessary. Id. ~ 10, Ex. E. Despite multiple meetings and 
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correspondence over several years, Van made clear in the April 2005 meeting that he distrusted 
Alzola and the administration going back to the 2001 accident. Tr. Vol. II 1120. 
Van's distrust was not limited to the Life Flight program or Gary Alzola. He also 
questioned the hospital administration's competence, and thought its vendors untrustworthy. 
Following the 2001 crash, Van was part of a team appointed to select a new helicopter for the 
hospital. Ex. 296,-r,-r 11-12. After the helicopter was selected and bids were accepted, Van felt 
that the COMP (maintenance) contract being negotiated for parts and maintenance was not 
sufficient to protect the hospital. Id. ,-r 13. He did not trust the dealer, Agusta, to honor its 
commitments. Id. He called or wrote Agusta on several occasions about this issue. Id. and 
Ex. 213. Eventually, Agusta asked that Van no longer participate in negotiations. Ex. 296 ,-r 13. 
Van wrote to Hermanson regarding his concerns. Ex. 323. In response, Hermanson reminded 
Van that PMC's in-house counsel was working extensively with the Life Flight team to negotiate 
the details of the agreement. Ex. 242. He stated that "while the language of the agreement may 
not comply with your particular desires, other involved parties," including Hermanson, "believe 
that we have a legally binding, workable agreement that serves our hospital well." Finally, he 
noted Van's personal trust issue with Agusta and told Van that his (Van's) "challenge [was] to 
find a way to resolve [his] personal trust issues so that [he] can move on toward a productive 
relationship with our vendor." Id. Not satisfied with this clear letter, Van approached Fletcher 
asking her what it meant. Ex. 294,-r 22. She told him it meant to stay out of the contract 
negotiations with Agusta. Id. 
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Fletcher considered these issues and the "years that we had spent working with Mr. Van, 
with the messages that had been sent to him through the years from Diane Kirse, later from 
Cindy Richardson, Pam Humphrey, Pam Niece," even from Pat Hermanson regarding the Agusta 
helicopter contract. Id. "[E]veryone had said to him 'You've got to let go of these things. Move 
forward.' You know, kind of 'Get with the program. These things have been dealt with now. 
Let's move forward. '" Id. 1122: 1 0-13. However, "it was very apparent to [Fletcher] that as 
another issue would come up for Mr. Van, all of these issues that we felt we had dealt with 
through the years would kind of come back to the fore for him." Id. 1122: 14-17. 
The critical issue was trust. Id. at 1122:18. While a large team might be able to function 
with some distrust in the ranks, that would not work for Life Flight. Id. 1122-23. Fletcher 
testified that without trust you do not have effective communication, you cannot handle conflict, 
H[y]OU don't have a team that's working together for goals and objectives, because they're 
splintered." Id. 1123:2-5. Of course, in Life Flight, the ability to effectively communicate and 
work together was critical, given the inherent dangers in any emergency ambulance program. Id. 
All of these factors led Fletcher to conclude that the team was "broken beyond compare." Id. 
Fletcher gave Mapes her handwritten notes of the interviews with Life Flight members and 
letters previously sent to Van addressing various issues. Id. at 1124. She told him that in her 
opinion, Van should be terminated. Id. Mapes concurred, and met with Hermanson regarding 
the proposed termination. After considering the issues, Hermanson agreed with Mapes and 
Fletcher and approved the termination. Id. 
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Humphrey requested that Van meet with her and Mapes on April 20. Van refused. 
Ex. 582, PMC001248. Instead, a conference call was arranged between Humphrey, Mapes, 
Fletcher, and Van. !d. Van wanted to talk to Fletcher only, saying the prior meeting (April 1, 
2005) was unfair, and discussing past issues with Alzola and Humphrey and the decision by 
Diane Kirse in 2002 to have Alzola evaluate him. Id. Mapes informed him that those issues had 
been investigated to death, there was no reason to go down that road. Id. at PMC001248, 49. 
Finally, Mapes informed Van he was being dismissed because of trust issues, and offered him a 
severance package in light of his years of service. Id. PMC's letter to Van informed him that his 
termination was due to his "inability to maintain positive interpersonal relations with his 
colleagues" and "foster a positive team environment." Ex. 421. 
II. ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL3 
A. Did the trial court act contrary to applicable legal standards by refusing to 
reinstate mandatory attorney's fees to PMC for prevailing on the breach of 
contract claims both on summary judgment and on appeal in accordance 
with Idaho Code Section 12-120(3)? 
B. Whether PMC is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal as the prevailing party. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A jury verdict that is supported by substantial and competent evidence may not be set 
aside on appeal. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho 388, 391, 257 P.3d 755, 758 
3 Van included as an issue on appeal, "Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to 
give a jury instruction pertaining to the spoliation of evidence?" Appellate Bf. 44. Van presents 
neither argument nor authority related to this issue, and has therefore waived it. Wheeler v. 
Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 266, 207 P.3d 988, 997 (2009) ("[I]ssues on 
appeal that are not supported by propositions oflaw or authority are deemed waived and will not 
be considered."). 
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(2011). When reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the evidence is construed in a light most 
favorable to the party prevailing at trial. Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 
Idaho 722, 726, 735 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1987). "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Uhf v. Ballard Med. 
Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653,657,67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). Evidence may be substantial even 
though it is contradicted. Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 136,219 P.3d 453, 460 (2009). In 
reviewing a jury verdict, the Court will not "substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury 
regarding the credibility ofthe witnesses, the weight of the evidence, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724,170 P.3d 387, 
389 (2007); Mackay, 151 Idaho at 399, 257 P.3d at 766. "Conflicts in the evidence and conflicts 
in the conclusions to be reached from the evidence remain questions for the trier of facts." 
Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100, 103,254 P.3d 1,4 (2011). 
In reviewing the conduct ofthe trial, the court must "disregard any error or defect in the 
proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." I.R. C.P. 61. In addition, 
the appellant must also show that if the error had not occurred, "a different result would have 
been probable." Soria v. Sierra Pac. Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 608, 726 P.2d 706, 720 
(1986). This standard applies to the admission or exclusion of evidence, as well as "any ruling 
or order or in anything done or omitted by the court." I.R.C.P.61. In addition, when appealing 
an evidentiary ruling under the abuse of discretion standard, the appellant must show not only 
that the error affected a substantial right, but also that the court abused its discretion. Hurtado v. 
Land 0' Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18,278 P.3d 415, 419 (2012). "Abuse of discretion is 
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determined by a three part test which asks whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 10, 189 P.3d 467,472 (2008) 
(citation omitted). "The trial court's broad discretion in admitting evidence will only be 
disturbed on appeal when there has been a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 
642, 646, 962 P .2d 1026, 1030 (1998) (citation omitted). 
IV. ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
A. The Jury's Special Verdict Finding That Van Was Not Terminated Because He 
Reported Suspected Safety Violations Is Supported by Substantial and Competent 
Evidence That He Was Terminated Because His Inability to Trust and Work with 
Others Was Threatening the Safety of the Life Flight Program. 
After listening to five weeks of testimony, including over a week of Van's testimony, and 
considering over one hundred exhibits, the jury took just three hours to determine that PMC had 
not violated Idaho's whistleblower law. Tr. Vol. II 1373-74, 1384:18-19. In response to the first 
two questions on the special verdict form, the jury found that Van had proven that he 
"communicated in good faith the existence of violations or suspected violations oflaws" and that 
"he suffered an adverse action." R. Vol. III 531-32. However, in response to the third question, 
the jury found, based on the evidence presented over the previous five weeks, that Van had not 
shown that he was terminated because he reported suspected safety violations or that PMC's 
reason for termination was not the true reason. !d. 
The jury's conclusion is supported by substantial and competent evidence presented at 
trial. Extensive testimony from Van, as well as from current and former PMC employees, 
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demonstrated that Van's attitude, communications, and hostility caused dysfunction in the Life 
Flight program long before Van made any safety reports in 2004 and 2005. Van's own 
testimony and writings established his longstanding mistrust of the hospital administration, his 
own supervisors, and his co-workers. PMC proved Van deliberately caused conflict on both a 
personal and team-wide basis. In addition, testimony from those unaffected by Van's reports of 
safety violations, including the chief flight nurse, Tom Mortimer, a fellow mechanic, Greg 
Stoltz, and Fletcher, demonstrated a legitimate concern that Van created problems endangering 
the Life Flight team. 
1. The jury's verdict that Van was not terminated because of his protected 
activity is supported by substantial and competent evidence that Van had a 
long history of being unable to trust others or let go of past issues. 
Throughout Van's testimony it is clear that he believed that he was the only one on the 
team who clearly saw the problems, the only one who really knew how things should be run, the 
only one truly concerned about safety. See Tr. Vol. II 1155-56. He clearly believed that those 
who ran the Life Flight program, whether Don Humphrey, Pam Humphrey, Alzola, Fergie, or 
even Hermanson, were not competent, were not honest, were not the right ones for the job. Van 
strives to paint a picture that he was merely the unwitting victim of others' lies, cover-ups, and 
incompetence. 
However, through the testimony of Van and others, the jury clearly drew a different 
conclusion from the evidence. Instead of seeing Van as a victim, they likely saw him as slightly 
paranoid, always blaming others, refusing to take responsibility for his own attitudes and actions. 
Instead of finding lies, incompetence, conspiracies and cover-ups, the jury could have found 
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ordinary people making occasional mistakes or simply having different viewpoints and priorities 
than Van. In short, the evidence showed an employee who was unmanageable, distrustful, and 
eager to spread this distrust throughout the team. Most importantly, however, the evidence 
showed that Van's distrust ofthe pilots and the entire chain ofPMC management affected the 
whole team. The atmosphere Van created progressed to the point that the flight team and Human 
Resources felt that it was affecting the safety, and even existence, of the Life Flight program. At 
that point something had to be done, and Van was terminated. 
Van argues that according to the literature, whistleblowers are unpopular and considered 
to be troublemakers. Van was considered a troublemaker; therefore, he must have been 
terminated for being a whistleblower. Appellate Br. at 49-51. However, this is a false syllogism. 
The evidence the jury considered in reaching its verdict showed instead that Van caused 
unnecessary conflict and pursued personal grudges when dealing with non-whistleblower issues 
for years prior to his termination. As it happens, he exhibited these same behaviors when he 
reported suspected violations. In other words, he refused to abandon his distrust and 
divisiveness, regardless of the issue. The jury was fully capable of making the distinction 
between terminating an employee for reporting safety violations and terminating an employee for 
exhibiting negative attitudes, distrust, and divisiveness in connection with both safety-related 
issues and non-safety related issues. 
Although Van argues that the reason given for Van's termination is "the embodiment of a 
whistleblower," Appellate Br. at 51, PMC's decision to terminate Van's employment was not 
based on his reports of safety violations. Throughout the record, it is clear that PMC responded 
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appropriately and positively to Van's safety recommendations. Over and over, Van's 
suggestions were considered by his supervisors and generally adopted in whole or in part. His 
reports of suspected violations were investigated, and appropriate action taken to address the 
alleged violations. Van's tennination was precipitated by his actions and attitudes separate and 
apart from his reports of suspected violations oflaw. Instead, it was his consistent inability to 
let go of any real or imagined offense, and his fostering of mistrust between individual elements 
ofthe Life Flight team, that led to the decision to tenninate him. 
a. The jury heard testimony that PMC was responsive to Van's safety 
concerns and frequently incorporated his suggestions for 
improvement into Life Flight policies. 
Although Van attempted to show that Life Flight was hostile toward his reports of safety 
concerns or violations, the record at trial told a different story. Instead of rejecting Van's reports 
or suggestions, PMC actively addressed his concerns, and in many cases adopted his suggestions 
for improvements. Everyone took safety issues seriously at Life Flight, including pilots and 
management. Ex. 215. PMC had a culture of safety, and its safety program was evolving in 
2004 and 2005. Tr. 1521; Tr. 698: 11-17. There was a safety officer and periodic safety 
meetings; safety was stressed. Tr. 1521. Part of the culture of safety was that "anybody can 
voice a concern at any time without ramifications." Tr. 1522:7-8; see also Tr. 1570. After the 
2001 crash, the Crew Resource Management ("CRM") program was put in place. Tr. 1569-70. 
CRM is a training program that encourages people to effectively communicate to resolve issues 
before they become problems. Tr. 1570. 
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However, Van seemed to believe that the only way to ensure safety issues were taken 
seriously or to deal with a problem was to terminate anyone who made a mistake. Ex. 252, 
PMC00243. PMC's approach deviated from that suggested by Van, but by no means indicated a 
lack of interest in safety. PMC fostered a culture where everyone had input on safety issues. 
PMC attained this culture by ensuring that no one was subject to retaliation for reporting safety 
concerns. No one was ever discouraged from raising important issues, regardless of whether it 
would be popular or not. Tr. 1544:12-14. Those who worked at PMC at the time did not 
remember anyone being subjected to retaliation for reporting safety concerns. Tr. 1522: 17-19. 
Van testified that in 2000 he created a document suggesting cold weather policies for Life 
Flight, which he submitted to Don Humphrey. Tr. 173. In response to his suggestions, a cold 
weather policy was put in place. Ex. 657, Tr. Vol. I 116: 19-20. New policies were put in place 
when the Agusta helicopter was purchased; the policies incorporated some of Van's suggestions. 
Tr. Vol. 1656: 15 - 657:6, Ex. 533. Other suggestions were rejected as too unworkable. Id. For 
example, Van wanted pilots to check the aircraft every hour. Id. at 657:9-11, Ex. 533; Tr. 906-
07 (pilots should remove accumulated snow every hour and dispatch should call them every hour 
to do so). Instead, the pilots monitored the weather and covered the blades and installed heaters 
if there was a chance the weather would dip below freezing. Tr. Vol. I 657: 15-23. This allowed 
the pilots to get the sleep they needed on overnight shifts in order to function effectively and 
safely. !d. at 658-59. When Van reported that snow and ice had accumulated under the blade 
covers, the policy was revised the next month to require blades to be wiped dry before installing 
the covers. Ex. 533, Tr. 914-15. 
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Management was also responsive to Van's concerns about pilots flying long hours or 
while fatigued. On July 4, 2003, Ron Fergie was delayed in Salt Lake City, Utah, for an 
extended time while repairs were made to the helicopter. Tr. 1617. While the helicopter was 
being repaired, the flight crew watched the fireworks and then took a nap. Tr. 1618. When the 
repairs were completed, Fergie flew back to PMC with the flight crew, but with no patients on 
board. Id. Romero, who was on board, did not think Fergie was too fatigued to fly, id., and 
would not have boarded the helicopter ifhe had not felt comfortable with Fergie flying the 
helicopter, Tr. 1623:3-6. By the time he had returned, Fergie had been "on duty" approximately 
20 hours. Because there was no patient on board, there was no FAA restriction on the number of 
hours he could fly. Tr. Vol. I at 28:6-17. Instead, the FAA leaves the decision of whether he 
should fly up to the judgment of the pilot. Id. Fergie had had a nap while in Salt Lake and he 
and the flight crew felt he was safe to fly home. Id. at 28:18-21,32:10-12; Tr. 1618. PMC's 
operations manual at the time also left it to the pilot's discretion, although a pilot was 
encouraged to cease operation ifhe was fatigued. Id. at 30-31. Meetings had been held after the 
2001 accident about "this exact thing, about using better judgment, ... and not being afraid to 
say 'You know what? ... We're going to knock off and go find a hotel.'" Id. at 31: 15-19. 
When Van learned Fergie had been on duty for 20 hours and reported it to Alzola, Alzola 
was upset that Fergie had, in his opinion, used "poor judgment," and he told Fergie so. Id. at 
32:5-7. The issue was brought up and discussed at a Life Flight leadership meeting in August 
2003. Tr. 264-65. Because in 2001, Brulotte, the pilot, had been on duty 17 hours when he 
crashed, others on the team were concerned about fatigued pilots flying. Id. Although Fergie 
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had not violated federal regulations, the others felt his actions had been unsafe. Tr. 297. Based 
on Van's raising the issue, the operations manual was changed in September to put a strict limit 
on duty time. Tr. Vol. I at 33-37, Ex. 240. Now, regardless of other circumstances, pilots "were 
restricted to a 16-hour duty day. Period." !d. at 37:1-2. The pilot in command would be 
responsible for taking the aircraft out of service if necessary. Tr. 297; see also Ex. 341, FAR 
91.3 ("The pilot in command of an aircraft is ... the final authority as to, the operation of that 
aircraft. "). Rather than welcoming this response to his concerns, Van called Alzola and picked 
the policy apart. Ex. 212, PMC00082. During a heated discussion, Van admitted that he was 
trying to get Alzola fired to get even for Alzola's actions in response to the 2001 accident. Id. 
Unwilling to accept these changes and Alzola's decision that pilots would have the final 
authority to take the aircraft out of service, Van wrote Policy Letter 12, instructing his mechanics 
to physically disable the aircraft if they judged the pilot unfit to fly. Tr. 297-98, Ex. 405. 
Life Flight management also investigated incidents where Van alleged retaliation for 
reporting safety concerns. In September 2003, Van accused Fergie of deliberately flying low 
over his house or "buzzing" him in retaliation for reporting the long duty day of July 4,2003. 
Tr. Vol. I at 26:23 - 27:5. On that occasion, Life Flight was bringing a patient with a serious 
injury from Soda Springs to PMC in Pocatello. Tr. Vol. I at 23-24. The flight crew had asked 
Fergie to stay low because the patient's condition would be seriously affected by the altitude. 
Id., Tr. 16l3-14. This was routine, and often the pilot would ask ifhe needed to fly lower than 
normal. Tr. 1613-14. 
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Rather than report to management or Fergie directly, Van started asking the flight crew 
about the incident, but they did not know anything about it. Tr. Vol. II at 878-79. When Van did 
report the incident to Alzola, Alzola investigated by speaking to both Fergie and the flight crew. 
Tr. Vol. I at 24-25. Fergie admitted he flew low, but stated he did not violate Federal Aviation 
Regulations. Id. at 24. Fergie also stated that he did not know which house Van lived in at the 
time of the incident. !d. at 26:18-22; Tr. Vol. 1633:4-7,635:3-8. Van's neighborhood was in the 
general path of a flight coming in from the hills east of Pocatello and going toward the hospital. 
Tr. 632. Alzola asked the flight crew about the incident, but they had not noticed anything, 
which they would have if Fergie had ''buzzed'' someone. Id. at 25: 1-6. In their view, "it was a 
totally routine mission." Tr. 1613: 5. Although Fergie had not violated any regulations, and no 
complaints had been received from other residents, Alzola counseled Fergie regarding choosing 
better flight paths when flying low to avoid homes and buildings, or not flying so low. Id. at 
26:17. 
Alzola responded appropriately and in accordance with FAA regulations when Van 
informed him that airworthiness directives (rules regarding helicopter scheduled maintenance) 
were overflown. On approximately June 10,2004, Van discovered that an airworthiness 
directive had been overflown on two occasions (by two different pilots). He reported the 
overflights to Alzola on June 21,2004. Tr. Vol. I at 42, Ex. 270, PMC00344. Alzola asked Van 
for his documentation, and investigated the events. Tr. Vol. I at 42. He discovered that on one 
occasion a pilot overflew a directive by .1 hour, and the other overflight was .4 hours. Ex. 270, 
PMC00341-42. In the first case, the pilot misjudged the time he had for a mission before the 
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required inspection. Id. In the second, the pilot had spoken to the mechanic and mistakenly 
believed the mechanic on duty had performed the required inspection during the daily inspection. 
Id. As required by the FAA, Alzola self-reported the overflights to the FAA on June 26, 2004, 
along with proposed corrective action. Id. Alzola proposed that whenever the aircraft was 
within five hours of the required inspection, the inspection would be performed at that time. Id. 
He also required the pilot to discuss the required maintenance with the mechanic and review the 
logs to ensure the inspection had been performed. Id. He emphasized to pilots that it was their 
responsibility to ensure maintenance had been performed or to decline a mission. Id. Van would 
review the records to ensure compliance and forward them to the director of operations. Id. at 
PMC00346. The FAA accepted those proposals, imposed no sanctions, and closed the case. Id. 
at PMC00347. Again, Van's concerns were investigated and appropriate action taken. 
Appropriate action was also taken after Stoltz reported that Nielsen may have taken off 
with ice on the blades of the rotors. Alzola investigated these allegations. Nielsen stated he had 
inspected the blades during pre-flight and there was no ice on the blades. Tr. Vol. 1544:12-
546:7. None ofthe flight crew noticed anything unusual upon takeoff, such as ice flying off or 
unbalanced rotors. No ice was seen on the helipad by the security guard. Ex. 294125. Stoltz 
did not see any ice on the blades when Nielsen lifted off, but knew only that 15-20 minutes 
before takeoff there had been ice on them. Tr. Vol. 1494-95. In light of these circumstances, 
Alzola determined that no reprimand was necessary. A later investigation by the FAA also 
reached the conclusion that the alleged violation was unsubstantiated. Ex. 200. 
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When Van discovered ice under the blade covers in February 2005, Alzola again 
investigated the circumstances. He discovered that Fergie had told Waller, who was assisting 
him, that the blades did not need to be wiped down before installing the covers, that the covers 
would knock the snow off. Tr. Vol. 1474. Ice on the blades of a sitting helicopter is not a safety 
or regulatory violation, only lifting off with ice on the blades is a violation. Tr. Vol. I 
648: 16-18; Tr. Vol. II 1021-22. Regardless, a meeting was held at which the incident was 
discussed, and pilots were told to wipe the blades before installing the covers. The cold weather 
policy was also revised to reflect this new, mandatory procedure. Tr. Vol. 1475,701-02. 
Each time Van reported a concern, the Life Flight team listened, investigated, and took 
appropriate action. Van did not always accept either the conclusions that the administration 
drew from the results of the investigation, or the manner in which the issues were dealt with. 
The jury heard consistent and clear testimony that safety concerns raised by Van and others were 
taken seriously. The testimony and exhibits provide substantial evidence that Van was not 
terminated for reporting violations of law. 
b. The jury heard substantial, competent evidence demonstrating Van's 
distrust of others and inability to let go of past events. 
Although Van tried to show that everyone around him was full of lies and deceit, the jury 
must have found instead that this was only Van's perception, not reality. Van's testimony began 
with the hard landing of the helicopter on Carter Street in 1993, twelve years before he was 
terminated. Tr. 138. The helicopter, which was flown by Don Humphrey (married to Pam 
Humphrey, chief flight nurse at the time, Tr. Vol. II 1200-04), sustained $150,000 in damages. 
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Id. At the time it was unknown what caused the helicopter to flame out. Months later, Van 
investigated the incident on his own and concluded that the continuous ignition switch was not 
on as required by the flight manual. Tr. 144, 150. Van reported this conclusion to Pam 
Humphrey, who became angry at her husband Don. Tr. 150-51. 
Van made several internally contradictory claims regarding this hard landing. First, he 
claimed it was both not reported and not "properly reported" to the FAA. Tr. 157 :9-12, 22-23. 
However, he also admitted he did not know whether it was reported (let alone how) and that the 
FAA ruled it an "incident."4 Tr. 158:16-18, 158:21 -159:3. In his own opinion, the damage to 
the helicopter was substantial, unquestionably making it an accident. Tr. 159. While he felt this 
was a basis for future retaliation, the only effect at the time was that he felt his social relationship 
with the Humphreys cooled. Tr. 166:15-20. Other than that vague reference to coldness from 
Don and Pam, he cites no retaliation from any source based on reporting his conclusion as to the 
cause of the hard landing. In fact, when Van reported the cause of the crash, Pam got angry at 
Don, not Van. Tr. 150-51. Van has no explanation for his belief that his job was in danger for 
reporting his findings to his friend Pam in 1993 .. In contrast, every other member of the Life 
Flight crew testified that they had no fear of reprisal for reporting safety concerns, and had never 
seen any retaliation. Tr. 1661:11-14 (McCarty), 1522 (Taysom), 1570 (Vickers), 1619 
4 Van determined in 2000 or 2001 that an accident is one in which a person suffers serious 
injury or death, or the aircraft suffers "substantial damage." Tr. 160:25 - 161 :5, 156:25-157:6, 
Ex. 442. An incident is an occurrence that is not an accident. Although the FAA investigates 
incidents, the FAA may not revise its conclusion when information is discovered after the FAA 
investigation is closed. Tr. Vol. II 1031. Here, the FAA found no cause for the engine failure 
during the investigation. Tr. Vol. II 983. 
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(Romero), Tr. Vol. I 177:11-13 (Mortimer), Tr. Vol. 1568:12-15 (Neilsen). Van continued to 
work as a mechanic with the Life Flight program without any adverse action being taken. 
Eleven months later, Pam changed her position to supervise the leu when the nursing division 
was restructured. Tr. Vol. II 836; Tr. Vol. 1331. 
Van reported no other problems in his relationship with either Don or Pam until seven 
years later in 2000, when marital problems between the couple were aired at the hospital. Pam 
was not Van's supervisor at this time. Tr. 709. She was the chief flight nurse, and reported to 
Gordon Roberts. Tr. 699:24 700:7. Don Humphrey was involved in an affair with Donna 
Faber, a paramedic who also worked with Life Flight. Tr. 667. The flight crew members were 
caught in the middle, and there was gossip going around. Tr. 1607, 1652. Van felt that they 
"weren't working together," and it "just wasn't good for the program." Tr. 165:22-24. The 
situation became tense, and Pam was ultimately reprimanded for not fairly scheduling Faber. 
Tr. 690, Tr. Vol. I 332. Pam immediately took the necessary steps to ensure that Faber was 
scheduled appropriately. Tr. Vol. 1332. 
Roberts requested that Audrey Fletcher "investigate problems and the breakdown of 
relationships between Life Flight team members." Tr. 674. During Fletcher's investigation, 
some ofthose in the program complained about Pam's management style. In addition to 
questioning others in the program, the HR director asked Van about his relationship with both of 
the Humphreys. Tr. 165. Van felt that he needed to expose the "chicanery" of those events 
seven years in the past. Tr. 166:6. Despite having no problems with the Humphreys between 
1993 and 2000, Van was upset that Don was promoted to Director of Operations, because he 
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believed that in 1993, Don had mistakenly failed to use the continuous ignition and, according to 
Van, covered it up. Tr. 166:10-14. Van also felt that Pam had failed at her job in 1993, 
attributing her later resignation and transfer to another department at PMC as an admission of 
guilt. !d. 
After fully investigating the situation in 2000, Fletcher recommended that Pam 
Humphrey either be terminated or that her supervisor work with her to become a better manager. 
Tr. 708:22 - 709. Roberts chose to continue to work with Humphrey, based on her past 
performance and his perception that she was under a lot of stress at the time. Tr. 701. 
Humphrey's performance evaluation reflected this process of improvement, stating that there 
was a lack of trust between the chief flight nurse and the staff and that improvements would be 
necessary to restore that trust. !d. However, Roberts had confidence in her as a manager and 
Pam made the necessary improvement. Tr. 701 :9-22; Tr. 1659. After her personal problems 
resolved, others on the team felt that Pam was a good manager who had personal integrity, high 
standards, held people accountable, and treated people fairly. Tr. 1562-64, 1606-08, 1660. 
When there were difficulties within the team, Pam dealt with them appropriately. Tr. 1587. 
One of the n1ajor challenges affecting the team was the 2001 crash of the helicopter 
flown by Tim Brulotte. Van had been to the site of the crash and was seriously affected by it. 
He felt that he was unfairly blamed for the crash (which was ultimately determined to be caused 
by pilot error). Tr. 217, Ex. 213 at PMC0097. 
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After the accident, members of the Life Flight team were instructed that any release of 
information would be handled by Marilyn Speirn in the hospital's5 PR department. Tr. Vol. I 
20:2-11. The hospital released a statement that the helicopter had crashed after it had undergone 
maintenance after leaving Salmon, and the cause was under investigation. Tr. 212: 10-13, 213 :24 
- 214: 1. Vickers, who was a temporary incident commander after the crash, told Speirn that 
given the circumstances, Van might be vulnerable to inferences he was at fault. Tr. 1566:2-16. 
Vickers believes that in response to his concern, Speirn included a statement in the release 
stating "Until they conduct their investigation the cause of the accident is pure speculation," in 
order to avoid unfair blame toward Van. Tr. 1567:24 - 1568:20. Despite this statement, Van felt 
that some minor details in the release were inaccurate (where he called from, the location 
Brulotte landed at, and the work performed), Tr. 211-12, and was upset that some in the 
community apparently believed that he was responsible for the crash, Tr. 217. He wanted 
information released indicating the pilot had admitted it was pilot error. He asked Audrey 
Fletcher, in January 2002, to release this information, although he knew the hospital wanted to 
wait until the investigation was complete. Tr. 216-17. 
He also asked Gary Alzola to release more information. Alzola told him that he should 
talk to his boss or Speirn. Tr. Vol. 120: 16-20. According to Van, Alzola told him that someone 
at the FAA told him he could not release any information until the FAA finished its 
investigation. Tr. 228. Later, Alzola stated that no one at the FAA told him he could not release 
5 At the time, PMC was Bannock Regional Medical Center. 
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infonnation, but that it was FAA policy. Tr. 230. Van later detennined that there was no such 
regulation, Tr. 232, although others at the hospital believed that certain regulations did prohibit 
release of infonnation. Ex. 213, PMC00088-94. The regulations provide that during the 
investigation, release of all factual infonnation "shall be made only through the [NTSB] Board 
Member present at the accident scene." Id. at 89. No infonnation may be released to any person 
not a party to the investigation before initial release by the National Transportation Safety Board 
("NTSB"). Id. The type ofinfonnation that could be released was the make and model of the 
aircraft, the nature and history of the flight, and the aircraft's operational status. Id. at 91. Alzola 
testified, "somewhere in my aviation career, I know I saw something that said something about 
not speculating about an accident while it's under investigation and discussing it." Tr. Vol. I 
21: 14-17. He later checked, but could not find such a regulation, and admitted such to Van. Tr. 
Vol. 121:18-25,22:16-25. James Wisecup, an expert witness for PMC, testified that his 
company would not release infonnation other than the basic infonnation after an accident, 
Tr. 1442, and Van himself did not believe that infonnation should be released about an accident 
before it was thoroughly investigated. Tr. 212:23-24; see also Tr. Vol. II 1027-28 (expert 
William Patterson testified that it is prudent to follow NTSB regulations to "prohibit fault or 
misstatements or misunderstandings."). 
Van continued to push the hospital to release additional infonnation on the 2001 crash. 
When the NTSB issued a preliminary report in March 2002, he asked the hospital to release it. 
Speim stated that they wanted to wait for the final report before making any release. Tr. 221-22. 
When the final report was released in June 2003, Van planned to release it on his own. Tr. 225. 
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Fletcher approached him and asked for his media contacts, as the hospital was going to make the 
press release, cautioning him that it might not be picked up by the newspapers as it was now "old 
news." Id. Van immediately began to suspect that she was lying to him and would not really 
release the report. Id. Despite Van's distrust, a statement from the hospital appeared in the local 
newspaper in July 2002. The first line stated, "The results of an investigation show mechanical 
failure was not responsible for a Nov. 14, crash of a Bannock Regional Medical Center 
LifeFlight helicopter." Ex. 213 at PMC0097. 
Although the hospital had released the requested information, Van was not satisfied with 
how the information had been released, and let his resentment towards Alzola fester. Van 
believed (and still believes) Alzola had lied to him. Tr. 230, Tr. Vol. 122:19-25. Alzola testified 
that he did not lie, but believed that it was policy not to release information on the cause of a 
crash during the investigation. Tr. Vol. I at 147:6-24, 21: 14-17. 
Based on Alzola's alleged lie about his inability to release information about the 2001 
crash, Van became firmly convinced that Alzola was not to be trusted, that Alzola and the 
administration would "shift the blame to Maintenance, even if they have information that will 
clear Maintenance of any wrong doing. They will be dishonest with Administration to attain 
their end to cover for the pilots at any cost. . " The secret policy of operations is to cover up 
the facts .... " Ex. 287, PMC001790-91 (emphasis added). He stated on several occasions that 
he did not trust pilots, even before most of these events occurred. Tr. Vol. 1214:15-19,688:4-5. 
This attitude colored all of his future interactions with Alzola, Humphrey, and others. 
31 Client:2808598.1 
c. The jury heard extensive testimony demonstrating Van's inability to 
accept decisions made by Life Flight and hospital administrators. 
Because of his mistrust, and his desire to have his own way, Van was unable or unwilling 
to accept decisions made by the Life Flight program and hospital administration regarding 
policies, discipline, and organization. For example, in September 2002 Diane Kirse, the new 
Program Director, informed Van that Alzola would be his supervisor and would fill out his 
performance appraisals. Tr. 228. Kirse was new and unfamiliar with Van's work, while Alzola 
worked side-by-side with him. Tr. Vol. II 1180-81, Ex. 252, PMC00243. Van did not like that 
idea and told the administration that he did not want to report to Alzola or the pilots. Tr. Vol. II 
843. He distrusted Alzola and did not believe he would get a fair performance evaluation from 
him. Ex. 296, Ex. B; Ex. 294 ~~ 7-11. Van thought someone was deliberately punishing him by 
making Alzola his supervisor, even though in most Life Flight programs the director of 
maintenance reports to the director of operations. Ex. 296, Ex. B; Ex. 582 PMCOOI265. 
After a meeting with Fletcher, Alzola, and Van's supervisor, Diane Kirse, Van agreed to 
let Alzola do an initial evaluation with the agreement he could ask Kirse to do the evaluation if 
he was not satisfied. Ex. 294 ~ 4-11. However, a week later, before Alzola even performed the 
evaluation, Van went to the CEO, Pat Hermanson, demanding a change to the organizational 
structure so he would not report to Alzola. Id. ~ 12. Hermanson made the change, and Van 
reported to Humphrey instead. Despite this resolution, on November 15, 2002, Van approached 
Fletcher again about his concerns regarding the accident "cover-up." Id. ~ 13. 
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After Humphrey became Program Director, Van approached her wanting to know what 
she was going to do about Alzola's failure to release information, and supposedly lying to him. 
Tr. Vol. II 855. Van wanted Alzola removed from his position as Director of Operations. Id. at 
858, Ex. 255. Humphrey suggested a meeting with Fletcher, Richardson, Alzola, and herselfto 
try to resolve the situation. !d. at 857. Van did not believe that would be a satisfactory solution. 
Id. A meeting was nonetheless held at which Van could express his concerns. Id. at 860. At 
that meeting it was emphasized that he needed to move forward, and also that any discipline 
would be confidential. Id. at 861, Ex. 245. Van did not move forward. In June 2003, he wrote 
to Humphrey's supervisor regarding the crash. Tr. Vol. 11864, Ex. 642. Another meeting was 
held in July 2003, and Van was counseled to trust others and let go ofthe past. Tr. 774-75, Ex. 
244. He did not. That meeting was followed by another meeting in September 2003, and a long 
memo from Van responding to the meeting summary four months later, again decrying the lack 
of punishment for Alzola's supposed misdeeds. Ex. 239. Even at the time Van was terminated 
in 2005, he brought up how Alzola had wronged him but had not been terminated. Tr. Vol. II 
862. 
Van refused to accept the decisions made by the hospital administration in regard to 
negotiating the COMP (maintenance) contract for the new Agusta 109 helicopter the hospital 
was purchasing. Van was part of an advisory committee that had selected the helicopter, and 
PMC asked for his input in regard to the COMP contract. Ex. 296 ~ 11-12. However, Van was 
dissatisfied with the terms of the contract being negotiated by the hospital's in-house counsel. 
Tr. Vol. II at 880-81. Van was unwilling to leave the negotiating in the hospital's hands. Ex. 
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241. He wanted the hospital to pressure Agusta to make more concessions and more specific 
terms in the contract. Ex. 212, PMC00085; Ex. 241. When he felt his concerns were not being 
heard, he wrote to and contacted the Agusta representative directly. Ex. 213, PMCOOI00-01.. 
Then he wrote to Hermanson, trying to get his own approach adopted by the hospital. Even after 
Hermanson informed him that the hospital was satisfied with the contract being negotiated and 
he needed to show some trust, Ex. 242, Van took things one step further, asking Fletcher to 
explain Hermanson's letter to him, Ex. 294 ~ 22. 
Throughout the contracting process, Van "frequently expressed his complaints" about the 
purchase and contract to others in the Life Flight team. Tr. 1576:5-11. When he saw other 
members of the team he would constantly or at least "frequently raise the same issue, the same 
complaints off the cuff ... just making comments that the way this is being handled is wrong and 
they shouldn't have done this, shouldn't have done that." Tr. 1578:23 - 1579:2. Van's response 
to some of the decisions in purchasing the helicopter were condescending. Tr. 1596:20-23. 
Basically, his attitude was that he was right, and anyone who disagreed with him was wrong. 
Tr. 1596:8-9. 
Van showed a similar attitude toward other issues. At times Van would bring up issues 
that the rest of the team did not think were that big, but they were big for Van. Tr. 1536: 1 0-12. 
If Van did not feel something was being handled the way he thought it should, he would go to 
the next level of management "and just keep hammering in on that issue until it created a lot of 
problems." Taysom, flight nurse; Tr. 1536: 13-17. Some were real concerns, but some were just 
"Mark being Mark." Ex. 294, PMCOOI256. Van challenged authority and did not accept 
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authority. Tr. 1571. Basically, "he thinks he's always right and that anybody who disagrees 
with him is wrong." Vickers; Tr. 1596:8-9. 
d. The jury considered evidence from multiple unbiased witnesses that 
Van's personal conflicts were interfering with the ability of Life Flight 
to function effectively. 
The effect of Van's distrust and unwillingness to accept solutions from others was not 
limited to his relationship with the pilots, but was felt throughout the program. The "medical 
team felt that he was trying to play-to get them to side with him against the pilots." Humphrey; 
Tr. VoL II 846: 18-20. The pilots felt that they were "having to walk on egg shells" and that 
every minute they were there they were being critically observed. If they did one thing wrong, it 
would escalate into a dispute. The culture was breaking down. Tr. VoL II at 844: 12-19. Others 
described that situation as "waiting for the other shoe to drop. Everyone was kind of on pins and 
needles with Mark and the contentious environment that resulted." Vickers, flight nurse; 
Tr. 1592: 22-25. 
Not only was the atmosphere tense and the entire team on edge, but it began to affect the 
safety of the program. One of the medics, Greg Vickers, testified that he was becoming 
concerned about the safety of the program. "[O]verall we had a good safety culture, but with the 
amount of animosity between Mark and the pilots and Mark and the administration, I think that 
there comes a point where that may be raising some concerns." Tr. 1573: 11-14. Although he 
trusted Van as an outstanding mechanic, "at some point the inability to work together ... creates 
the potential for safety problems." Tr. 1573:14-18. Van's friend, Chad Waller, believed that 
"Van's behavior has caused serious rift and is jeopardizing the program." Ex. 582, PMCOOI252. 
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He feared that the focus on the relationship between pilots and mechanics created "potential for 
overlooking other issues." Id. Mortimer thought that something needed to be done, and reported 
the situation to Humphrey. Exs. 214, 215. 
The concern that Van's attitude was affecting the safety of the program was not new, 
either. In 2003, when Van again brought up Alzola's involvement in the 2001 accident when 
discussing the new duty time policy effective September 2003, Alzola told Van that rehashing 
these issues and the conflict was interfering with the team's ability to communicate and work as 
a team, and that "safety may become an issue." Ex. 212, PMC00082. 
Tellingly, "after Mr. Van left things were a lot calmer. I think the attitude of the program 
was more positive .... there was better communications between the crew, the pilots, the 
mechanics and administration." Vickers; Tr. 1592: 18-22. "[A]fter Mark left ... we were able to 
kind of build our team back up again, and we didn't have the descension [sic] that we had there 
for a while." Alzola; Tr. Vol. I 152: 18-24. "After he left a lot these issues that have already 
been discussed. .. we just implemented the fixes for those ... we started to rebuild that trust, 
you know between our entire team ... we healed, for lack ofa better word." Mortimer; Tr. 
Vol. 1215:15-19. 
e. The jury considered credible evidence from multiple witnesses that 
Van presented a barrage of issues, which were never resolved to Van's 
satisfaction and were frequently resurrected after they had been 
resolved. 
While the jury heard all ofthe above discrete issues, equally importantly, it heard 
multiple witnesses sum up their experiences of dealing with Van. Regardless of whether they 
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worked in Life Flight or in Human Resources, the witnesses perceived the situation nearly 
identically: Van would bring up issues, would not accept solutions, and would continue to bring 
those situations up in the future. Nothing was ever resolved. 
Alzola testified: 
[H]e'd bring things up to me that I would attempt to address. And then he -- I 
would address them, and then he'd bring them up again. And we'd readdress 
them. And it could've made him mad maybe, because he felt that they maybe 
weren't being addressed properly. And then he'd want to have a meeting. And 
then we'd have a meeting, various meetings, with Pam and people in human 
resource. I don't know. It just seemed like it was a constant -- it kind of got to 
be, like, a constant turmoil ... of accusations and meetings and "You guys aren't 
doing this right." 
Tr. Vol. I at 41 :15 - 42:4. A friend of Van's, Waller, admitted that Van was unable to accept 
safety policies that were put in place that were not his own. Ex. 582, PMC001252. Lance 
Taysom, an EMT at PMC since 1994 and another friend of Van's, testified that Van "was just 
bringing up issues that we thought had been resolved, but they would come back again and we 
would hear about it over and over." Tr. 1519:23-25, 1528:15. 
Mark and I would get together and we would talk about things. He would be 
unhappy about some piece of equipment that we had, some way the aircraft was 
configured. I would have remembered discussing that in a leadership meeting, 
how we had a round table and people gave their ideas. We felt like we had the 
situation resolved and then maybe the next week Mark and I would be talking 
about it again. 
Tr. 1524:4-11. 
Another EMT, Vickers, testified that Van would "get a burr under his saddle about 
something and he didn't seem to be able to let it go." Tr. 1571: 1-2. When an issue came up, "he 
just kept going with that even after it had been explained and the rest of us thought it was put to 
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bed." Mortimer; Tr. Vol. 1 174:10-12. This was really an extension of Mark's personality where 
he likes to find something that bothers you and then talk about it and poke and prod you about it 
for a long time. Tr. Vol. 1 171: 11-16, 174: 15-25. An issue would come up, it would be dealt 
with, but ifit was not dealt with to Van's satisfaction, "it would come up again at some point 
later." Fergie; Tr. Vol. 1686:20-23. 
Fletcher testified: "[T]here would be another issue, some concern that Mark had, but 
these same issues that we thought we dealt with would come up again." Tr. Vol. II 1138:4-6. 
Van "was listened to ... not all of his expectations were met, but he raised some good points 
through the years. And there was action taken because he raised those points. But he couldn't 
accept solutions that were ... not entirely of his making." Id. 1157:23 - 1158:3. "He couldn't 
let things go. He just couldn't move forward. He couldn't work in a team." Id. 1167: 14-16. 
Distrust "was spilling over into everybody else in the program. And it was jeopardizing the rest 
ofthe program. That's why he was terminated." Id. 1166:23-25. Humphrey testified Van was 
not satisfied with any ofthe resolutions. And it was apparent that he wasn't going 
to be satisfied with any of the resolutions that we brought forth. . .. Mr. Mapes 
said "I feel like we're at an impasse. You know, ifhe's not going to accept 
resolution to these, you know, we're trying to meet his needs too, but we also 
need to meet the program needs, then, you know, is it in the best interest that he 
remains employed at PortneufMedical Center?" 
Well, 1 also felt that we [were] at an impasse. We had listened to him. We had 
set up items of resolution, agreements. He had agreed, and then he'd tum around 
and say, "Well, 1 don't think it was handled correctly. It wasn't fair," you know, 
"I'm not satisfied with this." And so, you know, when you get to that point, what 
other options do you have available? 
R. Vol. 11845:24 - 846:7, 846: 10-16. Van's inability to accept any solutions other than his own 
proposals, and his accusatory and divisive approach, caused the problems. 
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2. Van's argument that Van would never have been terminated if he had not 
engaged in protected activity is too attenuated and not supported by the 
evidence or the finding of the jury. 
Van argues that because the conflicts with management and other team members arose in 
connection with his report of safety violations, his termination was necessarily because of his 
protected activity. Appellate Br. at 52. This argument is too attenuated to be believed. It fails to 
take into account the extensive evidence that the reports regarding ice on the rotors in 2004 and 
2005 merely brought underlying trust issues to the forefront. Van was not terminated because he 
reported these issues, which were addressed appropriately by management, but because he again 
refused to accept management's solutions and continued to raise trust issues dating back to 2001, 
and even 1993, that had also been dealt with. It fails to consider Van's part in creating conflict 
between the pilots and mechanics and trying to get others to take sides. As discussed above, it 
was this behavior that caused others in the team to question the ability of the team to continue to 
safely function. Exs. 514, 515. The jury could, and apparently did, separate the situations 
demonstrating Van's dysfunctional behavior from the dysfunctional behavior itself. Van's 
argument fails on the facts. 
3. Because Van failed to prove his prima facie case, the burden never passed to 
PMC to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination. 
As discussed above, Van failed to establish the third element of a prima facie case under 
the Whistleblower Act-"the existence of a causal connection between the protected activity and 
the employer's adverse action." Van at 558. The evidence shows that since 1993, Van was 
never disciplined or demoted for raising concerns about any suspected violation. Instead, the 
Life Flight team investigated his reports and took appropriate measures to address them. His 
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recommendations for improvements were considered and often adopted. He was given a safety 
award by the team in January 2004 for contributing to the safety of the program. Ex. 272 at 
PMC000400. His last report of a suspected violation was the October 2004 report that Nielsen 
might have taken off with ice on the blades, yet Van was not terminated until six months later. 
The testimony demonstrates that Van was terminated for his inability to trust others, accept 
others' solutions to problems, and let go of past issues-a pattern of behavior amply 
demonstrated over a period of years in situations unrelated to any whistleblower issues. Thus, 
PMC never had the burden of proof of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Van's 
termination. Regardless, the evidence ofthe dysfunction and breakdown of trust within the Life 
Flight team discussed above was sufficient to meet that burden of proof. 
B. The Jury's Special Verdict Is Consistent with Idaho's Whistleblower Statute; 
Moreover, Van Is Barred from Raising the Issue for the First Time on Appeal. 
Van argues that the jury's verdict is contrary to law because it allows an employer to 
terminate an employee because of "discord arising from protected activity." Appellate Br. at 53. 
He asserts that the jury instructions failed to properly instruct the jury concerning whistleblower 
law. However, Van did not propose either a special verdict form or jury instruction concerning 
discord arising from whistleblowing activities. Instead, he raises this wholly new argument for 
the first time on appeal. See R. Vol. II 207-10 (proposed special verdict form), 211-50, Tr. 1261-
88; see also Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 812,252 P.3d 71,93 (2011) 
("This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal."). A party cannot raise 
on appeal the giving of a jury instruction that allegedly misstates the law unless the party timely 
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objected to the specific instruction on the record, stating the grounds of the objection. Chapman 
v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 761-62,215 P.3d 476, 481-82 (2009); see also Jones v. Crawforth, 
147 Idaho 11, 19-20,205 P.3d 660,668-69 (2009) (under Rule 51(b), issue of omission ofa 
party from the special verdict form was not preserved for appeal when no specific objection to 
the omission was made at trial). Having failed to request such an instruction, or raise an 
objection on this basis, Van has not preserved this issue for appeal. I.R.C.P.51(b). O'Shea v. 
High Mark Dev., LLC, 153 Idaho 119, 280 P.3d 146 (2012) (holding the Court need not 
consider jury instruction on appeal because party did not object to it before the trial court). 
The jury's verdict does not undermine the legislature's goal of protecting public 
employees from adverse action because of their reports of suspected violations of law. The jury 
explicitly found that Van was not terminated because of his protected activity of reporting 
safety violations. R. Vol. III 531-32. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, there is ample evidence showing that Van was terminated because he fostered 
dysfunction and distrust between members of the Life Flight team and was unwilling to accept 
decisions by the hospital management with which he did not agree. See supra at V.A.l(b) & (c), 
and see generally Tr. Vol. 1513:19-20 ("it's just kind ofa little bit of Mark's nature to have 
conflict with people"), id. 171: 11-16 ("Mark has the personality where he likes to-you know, 
he'll find something ... that would bother you, and then he could talk about it and poke and prod 
you about it and go on for a long time about those types of things."). Reporting alleged 
violations by the pilots might create some discord, but the dysfunction in the team was a result of 
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personal conflict, refusing to accept decisions by superiors, and Van trying to get other Life 
Flight members to take sides. 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Regard to the Admission of 
Evidence; However, the Claimed Errors Are Harmless and Would Not Have 
Resulted in a Different Jury Verdict. 
Van alleges that the district court abused its discretion in excluding certain hearsay 
statements, admitting e-mails sent after Van's termination, and excluding evidence of pain and 
suffering. However, the district court reversed its ruling on hearsay one day after it was made, 
Van did not object to several of the e-mails admitted, and pain and suffering are only relevant to 
Van's damages ifhe had prevailed, which he did not. Accordingly, no error affected Van's 
substantive rights, and any error was harmless and would not have affected the outcome of the 
trial. See LR.C.P. 61. Thus, the jury's verdict must stand. 
1. Any error in initially denying the admission of statements by PMC 
employees was harmless as the court later allowed Van and other witnesses 
to testify concerning those matters. 
Van was not harmed by the district court's initial ruling that Van's testimony regarding 
statements by PMC employees was inadmissible hearsay, because the court reversed its ruling on 
the next day of testimony and expressly allowed counsel to conduct further direct examination of 
Van on those issues ifhe chose. Tr. 928-30. On February 1 (a week into testimony), after 
considering the relevant case law, the court determined that statements made by PMC employees 
that were within the scope of their employment would not be excluded as hearsay. Tr. 928:18-
929:1. The court told Van, "If you want to go back and ask more questions of Mr. Van with 
regard to some of those statements that I did not allow in, I certainly will allow you to do 
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that. ... If you need to go back and elicit some additional testimony from Mr. Van, you 
certainly can." Tr. 929: 1 0-13, 929:25 - 930: 1. After this decision was made, Van testified again 
on direct examination on February 2, cross-exam on February 2-4, and on rebuttal February 23. 
R. Vol. III 524-25, 27. Van had a full opportunity to testify regarding the previously excluded 
statements, and cannot assign error to the reversed ruling. 
Moreover, Van has not shown that a substantial right was affected by this ruling or that, 
barring the error, the jury's verdict would probably have been different. Van has not shown that 
he was "denied his right to fully present his case as allowed by the Rules of Evidence." 
Appellate Br. at 57. He admits he used other methods to get the message out without actually 
stating what the hospital employee had said. Id. For example, when at a later point PMC 
objected to a statement that was not within the scope of the employee's duties, Van simply 
reworded his testimony slightly. Compare Tr. 1359: 18-20 ("Kirk Cornelius, one of the pilots, 
told me ... he told me that he couldn't ... ") with Tr. 1360:5-6 ("One ofthem became so 
concerned he couldn't sleep."). There is no evidence that this had any significant impact on 
Van's ability to tell his story. 
Finally, Van had a full opportunity to present his case through direct and cross-
examination of the witnesses whose out-of-court statements were initially excluded. Van has not 
pointed to any evidence that was not substantially presented because of the court's ruling. Van's 
appeal identifies the following testimony that was excluded: (1) testimony by Gordon Roberts 
on January 28 that his boss, Emily Davidson-Taylor, thought that Pam Humphrey was retaliating 
against Donna Faber and what Davidson-Taylor told him to do with the written warning given to 
43 Client:2808598.1 
Humphrey, (2) testimony by Roberts about something Alzola had told him, (3) Van's testimony 
concerning a conversation between Fergie and Stoltz, and (4) Van's testimony about what Waller 
had told him about wiping the blade covers. Appellate Br. at 53-56. In each case, however, the 
relevant information was introduced either through the same witness or through the individual 
making the out-of-court statement. 
Roberts testified, for example, that Humphrey did not like working with Faber after she 
learned of her husband's affair with Faber, and would often complain about Faber's mistakes. 
Tr. 668:1-23. After the hearsay objection was sustained regarding Emily Davidson-Taylor's 
statement, Roberts testified that he gave Humphrey a written warning about reprisals against 
Faber. Tr. 670:10-11. In addition, responding to a juror's question, Pam Humphrey testified that 
she had been reprimanded based on her supervisor's perception that she was not scheduling 
Faber fairly. Tr. Vol. 1332:1-8. Rather than stating what Alzola told him, Roberts testified that 
his understanding of the conversation was that Van needed to "buck up." Tr. 688. 
Although the court did not allow Van to testify regarding what Fergie said Stoltz told him 
about the ice on the blades on October 31, 2004, Tr. 896, Van already had testified about the ice 
on the blades incident, Tr. 894. He later testified to his concern that Fergie was changing 
Stoltz's testimony to downplay the severity of the October incident, and that in response he 
asked Stoltz to write a statement about the incident, which was entered into evidence. Tr. 897. 
Further, Stoltz, Nielsen, and Fergie all later testified regarding their understanding ofthe 
incident. Tr. Vol. 1488-97,541-48,643-45,654-55. Fergie even admitted that he may have 
used frost and ice interchangeably when describing the incident, since under the regulation it 
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made no difference. Tr. Vol. 1654:25 - 655: 15. Finally, Waller testified that Fergie told him he 
did not need to wipe the blades down, but could just install the blade covers, which would knock 
the snow off. Tr. Vol. I 465-66. The transcript demonstrates Van was allowed to introduce the 
testimony he wanted. Viewing the record as a whole, there is no basis on which this Court could 
conclude that minor changes to testimony would have led to a different outcome. Accordingly, 
the verdict must stand. 
2. The district court correctly held that e-mails sent by Van to PMC employees 
after his termination were admissible; further, any error was harmless. 
The admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and will 
only be overturned if the appellant can show that the ruling affected a substantial right and that 
but for the error, the verdict would more likely than not have been different. Soria, 111 Idaho at 
608, 726 P.2d at 720. This, Van has not done. More importantly, however, the Court will not 
consider objections raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) ("Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at trial."). In this case, PMC sought to introduce several e-mails 
sent in 2009 to PMC employees by Van under the pseudonym Dale Larson. Tr. 391-92, Ex. 320. 
The court denied Van's motion to exclude exhibit 320, ruling that 
[TJhere is certainly some relevance to this and I do not believe that the prejudicial 
value would outweigh the probative value in admitting--considering exhibit 320. 
Mr. Nielson, I'm going to deny your motion to exclude the use of this exhibit in 
trial for the defendant. I'll certainly hear you on your objections as they corne 
up with regard to this e-mail and any other e-mails that the defendant attempts to 
ask to have admitted. 
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Tr. 398:6-15 (emphasis added). The court expressly held that it would consider objections to the 
other e-mailsastheycameup.butruledonlyonExhibit320.Id. On February 4,2011, 
defendant admitted Exhibits 317-319 without objection by Van. Accordingly, Van did not 
preserve the issue of the admissibility of Exhibits 317-319. Schwan's Sales Enter. v. Idaho 
Transp. Dep't, 142 Idaho 823, 833, 136 P.3d 297,307 (2006) (holding that where the court 
deferred ruling on a motion in limine, counsel was obligated to object when the evidence was 
offered. Because counsel did not object, the issue was waived.). 
a. Van's post-termination e-mails are relevant to Van's attitude toward 
the team and his general refusal to let things go. 
PMC argued that the e-mails, Exhibits 317-320, were relevant to the issue of Van's "trust 
issues, which is central to PMC's defense." Tr. 393-94. The e-mails "demonstrate his pattern of 
distrust and antagonism toward the people that he worked with." .Tr. 395:7-10. Evidence is 
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable .... " LR.C.P.401. Here, evidence 
that Van harbored significant ill will toward his former colleagues, was willing to act on that ill 
will, and shared the e-mails with a large number ofPMC employees, makes it more probable that 
Van had this same ill will and willingness to share it in 2004 and 2005. It is also significant that 
the photo and caption in Exhibits 317-319 referred to Nielsen de-icing the helicopter, as 
Nielsen's alleged failure to do so in October 2004 was a big issue for Van. Referring to Nielsen 
as the "de-icing boy" is yet another instance of Van bringing up the past years later, unable to let 
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go of any slight. It is precisely for this attitude and behavior that PMC terminated Van's 
employment. 
Further, the evidence admitted was within the scope of comparable evidence admitted by 
Van. The court noted that Van was allowed to introduce evidence regarding an accident in 1993 
that also had limited relevance to the termination in 2005. Tr. at 397-98. The primary 
significance of that testimony and testimony concerning Donna Faber in 2000 was to show that 
Pam Humphrey was likely to retaliate against Van. In both cases, the evidence went toward the 
person's attitudes, even though both the 1993 incident and 2009 e-mails were remote in time to 
the 2005 termination. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
Exhibits 317-320. 
b. The admission of Exhibit 320 was harmless error since Van failed to 
object to other similar e-mails in Exhibits 317-319, or to testimony 
regarding his attitude toward PMC employees. 
Aside from Exhibit 320, three other exhibits contained the same attached photograph and 
similarly disparaging and antagonistic messages: Exhibits 317, 318, and 319. On February 4, 
PMC admitted Exhibit 319 without objection from Van. Tr. 1319-20. Van admitted that he had 
written the e-mail under the name Dale Larson to Pam Humphrey. The e-mail contained a photo 
of Nielsen de-icing the Life Flight helicopter, taken from the local newspaper. Van had altered 
the headline to read "PMC's Life Flight de-icing boy, Barry Nielson [sic]." The body of the 
e-mail stated: "Your boy comes through for you." Tr. 1319-21. Exhibits 317 and 318 were also 
admitted without objection from Van. Tr. 1322-23. Each ofthose exhibits had the same 
attached photo, but read, respectively, "Awsome [sic], you ought to see" and "Awsome [sic], 
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what a dumbass." These exhibits had been sent to Taysom, Mortimer, Rick Ross, Romero, 
Fergie, Alzola, Vickers, and McCarty-pilots, flight nurses, dispatch, and even shipping and 
receiving workers. Tr. 1322-24. 
Although the message sent in Exhibit 320 to Pat Hermanson was more extensive than in 
Exhibits 317-319, the message was the same: Van not only was willing to hold a long time 
grudge, he was willing to act on it. This is the same behavior that led to his termination. The 
e-mails alone, however, were not the basis for PMC's argument on this point. Although a 
graphic illustration of Van's attitude, the record is replete with evidence that Van never got over 
how the 1993 incident was handled, bringing it up in 2000 in response to an inquiry by Human 
Resources about Pam Humphrey's management. Tr. 166. Van made clear that he never got over 
Alzola's misstatement in 2001 that he could not release information about a crash until the FAA 
finished its investigation. Tr. 252:21 - 253: 10. Similarly, Van never forgot any mistake or 
misstep by a pilot. See, e.g., Tr. 166:23 - 167:4. These e-mails were relevant to PMC's defense, 
and because similar evidence was admitted to which Van did not object, any error was harmless. 
3. The district court correctly held that evidence regarding damages for pain 
and suffering was not admissible as such damages are not among those 
allowed under section 6-2106; nevertheless, the issue is moot because Van did 
not prevail on the merits. 
The district court correctly held that the Whistleblower Act did not provide for an award 
of pain and suffering, but only for the remedies specifically enumerated in section 6-2106. In 
interpreting statutory language, the starting point is always the plain language of the statute. 
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 312, 109 P .3d 161, 166 (2005). Statutes 
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concerning the same issue should be read together, so as to give effect to all words in the 
statutes, if possible. Hillside Landscape Constr., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 151 Idaho 749,753, 
264 P.3d 388,392 (2011). Here, section 6-2105 defines damages as "damages for injury or loss 
caused by each violation of this chapter, and includes court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." 
IDAHO CODE § 6-2105(1). It then provides that "An employee who alleges a violation of this 
chapter may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both .... " 
Id. § 6-2105(2). However, although damages are broadly defined, the remedies a court may 
provide are expressly and exclusively limited: 
A court, in rendering a judgment brought under this chapter, may order any or 
all of the following: 
(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions of 
this act; 
(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before 
the adverse action, or to an equivalent position; 
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights; 
(4) The compensation for lost wages, benefits and other 
remuneration; 
(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and attorneys' 
fees; 
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred dollars 
($500), which shall be submitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the general 
fund. 
IDAHO CODE § 6-2106 (emphasis added). The act does not allow the court to provide any other 
reliefto an employee except these specific remedies. "It is a basic tenet of statutory construction 
that the more specific statute section addressing the issue controls over the statute that is more 
general." Wheeler, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988; 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 170. Here, the more 
specific statute is section 6-2106, governing the relief the court may order. Considering these 
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two statutes together, the district court reasoned "the court has to give plain meaning to the 
words. I think that's really what it comes down to ... I look at Idaho Code 6-2106 and it gives 
me five or six specific things that the court can order. Also, looking at the Supreme Court's 
decision in Van versus PMC, they also talked about that under the act a court is authorized to 
order any or all of the following." Tr. 935:25 - 936:1; 936:22 - 937:2. Ultimately, the court 
concluded "that 2105 allows for actual damages. 2106 defines what those damages can be. It 
does not include compensatory damages such as pain and suffering." Tr. 937:12-15. 
Nothing in the wording indicates the legislature intended to compensate public 
employees for any and all types of injuries, or that it contemplated any noneconomic damages 
when determining the specific remedies a court could provide. The remedies allowed closely 
follow the reasonably foreseeable consequences of retaliation: loss of employment, loss of 
benefits and seniority, loss of wages, and attorney's fees for bringing suit. IDAHO CODE 
§ 6-2106. The legislature did not express an intent to create a "make-whole" remedy, but only to 
establish a cause of action for public employees. IDAHO CODE § 2101. Nothing in the legislative 
history, R. Vol. II 325-36, is to the contrary. The establishment of a cause of action does not 
necessarily imply the creation of unlimited remedies. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-2209(4) ("The 
district court may issue any of the following orders ... "), IDAHO CODE § 72-101, et seq. 
(providing limited, exclusive remedies to injured employees). The legislature could have 
followed the Federal False Claims Act, which expressly states that "any employee ... shall be 
entitled to all relie/necessary to make that employee . .. whole." 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (emphasis 
added). It did not. It could have simply stated that "A court, in rendering a judgment brought 
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under this chapter, may order such relief as is warranted by the evidence" or "such relief as is 
just and equitable." It did not. Instead, it enumerated six remedies that a court could order, to 
the exclusion of all others. To read section 6-2105 as suggested by Van would be to render the 
entirety of section 6-2106 a nullity. Accordingly, the district court did not err in giving effect to 
both sections 6-2105 and 6-2106. 
Furthermore, the issue of whether pain and suffering is compensable under section 6-
2106 is moot, since Van did not prove that PMC was liable for any damages. Villa Highlands, 
LLC v. W Cmty. Ins. Co., 148 Idaho 598, 608-09, 226 P.3d 540, 550-51 (2010) (evidence of 
consequential damages moot where plaintiff did not prove defendant was liable). Accordingly, 
the Court need not address this issue. Moreover, contrary to Van's argument on appeal, the 
exclusion of testimony regarding Van's pain and suffering would not have aided the jury to reach 
a different resolution regarding whether Van was terminated because of his protected activity. 
Appellate Br. at 64. The "wrenching dilemmas that Van was placed in by engaging in protected 
activity," id., are irrelevant to whether that protected activity was PMC's basis for terminating 
Van's employment. Van's argument implies that evidence of his pain and suffering would have 
made the jury more sympathetic toward him, causing the jury to find in his favor. However, an 
emotional plea or sympathy is not a proper basis for a verdict. Old Chiefv. United States, 519 
U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (quoting Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R~ CIV. P. 403 ("'Unfair 
prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."». Accordingly, the district court 
correctly excluded improper and irrelevant evidence. 
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D. The District Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Instruct the Jury on Provocation, 
Which Is Not the Law in Idaho and Was Not Warranted by the Evidence. 
A court must include a requested instruction in the jury instructions if "there is evidence 
at trial to support the instruction" and "the instruction is a correct statement of the law." 
Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho 388, 391, 257 P.3d 755, 758 (2011). Although 
on appeal Van focuses on the first prong of this analysis, Appellate Br. at 65-67, he does not 
argue that the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law. Therefore, he fails to show 
that the court's decision not to give the instruction was erroneous. 
1. Van has presented no precedent that his proposed jury instruction is a 
correct statement of Idaho whistleblower law. 
Van's requested jury instructions on provocation were based solely on federal anti-
discrimination law, not on any applicable Idaho statute or precedent. R. Vol. II 227-32, 
Appellate Bf. at 65. There is no such provision under Idaho's Whistleblower Act, and no federal 
law claims were alleged in Van's amended complaint. Nor is there any precedent in Idaho that 
supports such a jury instruction. Van has not cited any case law that would support the addition 
of such a standard to Idaho law. Accordingly, because this standard is not a correct statement of 
Idaho law, the district court did not err in refusing to include it in the jury instructions. 
2. The district court correctly held that the evidence presented in the case did 
not warrant an instruction on provocation. 
A review of the cases cited by Van as supporting the requested instruction shows that the 
court correctly held the instruction was not warranted by the evidence produced at trial. All of 
the cases supporting this jury instruction involved an immediate, emotional response to 
discriminatory conduct. For example, after an employee was subjected to his boss's allegedly 
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anti-Semitic actions, he yelled obscenities through the door at his boss who had just left. Hertz v. 
Luzenac Am., Inc., 370 F.3d 1014, 1022 (lOth Cir. 2004). Similarly, immediately after being 
terminated,an employee yelled obscenities at the responsible party and threatened to kill him at 
the end of the shift. Precision Window Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 963 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1992). 
While the Precision court recognized that there should be some leeway granted for impulsive 
behavior, the court ultimately held that the employee's conduct deprived him of the right to 
reinstatement. Id. See also NLRB v. M&B Headware Co., 349 F.2d 170, 174 (4th Cir. 1965) 
(employee angered by layoff threatened supervisor and was rude to vice-president several days 
later did not lose protection of the law for "later unpremeditated and quite understandable 
outburst of anger that in no way harms or inconveniences the employer."). 
Here, however, it is undisputed that Van never shouted at anyone or otherwise responded 
impulsively or emotionally to any action by PMC. Tr. 1438:18-22. The "provocations" cited by 
Van, Appellate Br. at 66, were merely instances where Van did not get his own way. For 
example, in an August 2003 meeting, the Director of Operations decided that the pilot in 
command would make the final decision whether to take the aircraft out of service. Tr. 297:2-
11; see also Ex. 341 , FAR 91.3 ("The pilot in command of an aircraft is ... the final authority as 
to, the operation ofthat aircraft."). In response, Van created Policy Letter 12, a two-page, single-
spaced document in which he referenced the 2001 crash and stated, in part: 
It is apparent to me now, that the new Program Director, Director of Operations 
and the Chief pilot will shift the blame to Maintenance, even if they have 
information that will clear Maintenance of any wrong doing. They will be 
dishonest with Administration to attain their end to cover for the pilots at any 
cost. ... The secret policy of operations is to cover up the facts .... Since the 
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powers that be conspired to shift the blame to our department for Tim's accident. 
I feel it is our responsibility to baby sit the pilots and question there [sic] fitness 
for flight or any other pilot activities that could cause a situation that could 
blacken our reputations or the programs [sic]. ... I talked with Carl Mcguire of 
the FAA. The only way we can stop the pilot from flying away, is to legally 
disable the aircraft so it can't be started. With a write up of the work 
accomplished. I would suggest the battery be removed and secured in your 
vehicle, ... leave the area with the battery so it cannot be reinstalled. 
Ex. 287 at PMC001790-91. Van drafted this policy on August 21 and required the other 
mechanics to sign the policy, which they did on August 23,2003, and September 21,2003. Id. 
Van testified that he was angry and upset when he wrote it. Tr. at 1131 :8-14. However, if this 
was merely an emotional response, why leave it in the maintenance manual? Can it really be 
considered an ''unpremeditated'' "outburst of anger" a month later when he discussed it with 
Frank Prickett, who subsequently signed it in September 20m? Tr. at 1139. In fact, Van 
affirmed at trial that he still stood behind the policy as written. Tr. 299: 14-16. 
Van did not respond impulsively to those occasions when he was allegedly "provoked," 
but deliberately responded in ways that undermined Life Flight's ability to function. When Van 
couldn't re-hash issues in the March 24 meeting that had been discussed in February's meeting, 
he did not fly off the handle, but took four days to draft his March 28 letter to the crew members 
about those issues. See also Tr. 1220-21 (Van responded to September 2003 meeting summary 
in January 2004). Nothing in the record regarding the April 1 meeting indicates Van made any 
impulsive or emotional outbursts. Rather, the meeting reflects that Van acted consistently with 
his usual behavior, bringing up old issues, expressing his distrust, and refusing to accept any 
apology. Those actions were not "unpremeditated" or "outbursts of anger that in no way 
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harm[] ... the employer." NLRB, 349 F.2d at 174. Because the cited cases are inapposite to the 
case at hand, the district court correctly found that the evidence did not support the use of those 
instructions. 
E. The District Court Correctly Held That PMC Is Entitled to an Award of Attorney's 
Fees and Costs Based on Idaho Statute and This Court's Prior Decision. 
The district court correctly determined that as the prevailing party on all claims, PMC 
was entitled to an award of fees and costs on appeal and costs for the jury trial. Van does not 
dispute that PMC was the prevailing party both at trial and on appeal, nor does he dispute the 
amount of the costs and fees awarded. His appeal is limited to whether the district court abused 
its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Whether to award fees and costs 
is committed to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear 
abuse of discretion. Bingham v. Montane Res. Assocs., 133 Idaho 420, 425, 987 P .2d 1035, 1040 
(1999). "Abuse of discretion is determined by a three part test which asks whether the district 
court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries 
of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Lee, 146 Idaho at 9, 189 
P.3d at 471 (citation omitted). 
1. The district court correctly held that Idaho Code Section 12-101 and Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provide authority for an award of reasonable 
costs. 
The district court correctly held that as the prevailing party on both Van's whistleblower 
claim and his breach of employment claim, PMC was entitled to an award of costs both on 
appeal and in the jury trial. "Costs shall be awarded by the court in a civil trial or proceeding to 
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the parties in the manner and in the amount provided for by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." 
IDAHO CODE § 12-101 (emphasis added). The Rules of Civil Procedure similarly provide that 
"[C]osts shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties ... unless 
otherwise ordered by the court." LR.C.P.54(d)(I)(A). Van does not dispute that PMC is the 
prevailing party in this case. Cf Appellate Br. at 67. Under both the statute and the rule, PMC 
was entitled to an award of certain costs as a matter of right under Idaho Rule of Ci viI 
Procedure 54(d)(l)(C), provided the court in its discretion awards the costs, which it did. R. 
Vol. III 558-59. The district court reviewed the requested costs, found them reasonable and in 
accordance with the Rules, and granted them. R. Vol. III 559. It did not abuse its discretion in 
doing so. The district court further reviewed PMC's request for discretionary fees and costs 
under Rule 54(d)(l)(D), awarding those it found allowable and denying the remainder. R. 
Vol. III 560-66. Again, it acted within the discretion granted by Rule 54, and its decision must 
be upheld. 
Van argues, without citation, that section "12-101 does not provide statutory 
authorization for costs, but actually establishes that when costs are to be awarded, they are to be 
awarded in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure." Appellate Br. at 68. This is against 
the weight of Idaho cases where costs are routinely awarded on no other basis than Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54 without further authority. This Court has expressly held that "Idaho Code 
section 12-101 provides clear statutory authority for the award of costs .... " State v. Dist. 
Court, 143 Idaho 695, 701, 152 P.3d 566,572 (2007) (emphasis added). Further, the statute does 
not say "when or if costs are awarded they shall be in accordance with the Rules of Civil 
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Procedure," it says "Costs shall be awarded .... " If the legislature meant to only give 
procedural instructions, it could do so. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 12-114 (" Whenever costs are 
awarded to a party by an appellate court, ifhe claims such costs he must tax the same before the 
clerk. ... ") (emphasis added). Idaho Code Section 12-101 authorizes an award of costs to PMC 
as the prevailing party without the need for further statutory authority. 
The Whistleblower Act does not limit the authority of section 12-101 to award costs as a 
matter of right. It allows an award of "attorneys' fees and court costs" if the employee's claims 
are without merit, IDAHO CODE § 6-2107, but it does not preclude an award of the specific and 
limited costs allowed under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). If the court found Van's 
claims were without basis in law or fact, the court could have awarded costs not included under 
Rule 54. See, e.g., Idaho Dep 't a/Health v. South/ark Lumber Co., 123 Idaho 146, 149,845 
P .2d 564, 567 (1992) (holding that where statute allowed for award of expenses, recoverable 
costs were not limited to those enumerated in Rule 54). Notwithstanding this expansion of the 
award of costs where an employee brings a frivolous claim, nothing in the Whistleblower Act 
precludes an award of costs to the prevailing party under Rule 54. Compare IDAHO CODE § 6-
2107 (expanding the award of costs) with § 41-1839(4) (providing an exclusive remedy, "this 
section and section 12-123, Idaho Code, shall provide the exclusive remedy for the award of 
statutory attorney's fees in all actions between insureds and insurers ... ") (emphasis added). 
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2. Having determined that PMC prevailed on all claims that were the subject of 
the prior appeal, the district court properly awarded costs and fees on 
appeal. 
In its decision in Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, this Court ordered, "[t]he district court 
may award costs and fees incurred with respect to the appeal to the party that prevails on 
remand." Van, 147 Idaho at 561, 212 P .3d at 991. Thus, the district court was expressly 
authorized to award fees and costs on appeal to whichever party prevailed on remand. The 
decision whether to grant or deny fees and costs was within the court's discretion. Consistent 
with this order, the district court awarded fees and costs on appeal to PMC, which was 
unquestionably the prevailing party on remand. 
On appeal, Van argues that PMC is not entitled to an award of costs and fees on appeal 
because the only basis for Van's request for fees on appeal was Idaho Code Section 12-121. Van 
argues that because the court did not find Van's appeal to be frivolous, there was no statutory 
basis for an award offees. Appellate Br. at 69. "Costs [on appeal] shall be allowed as a matter 
of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." 
I.A.R. 40. Thus, the award of costs on appeal is not error. 
Further, "[t]he Supreme Court in its decision on appeal shall include its detennination of 
a claimed right to attorney fees .... " I.A.R.41. In this case, this Court detennined that the 
district court should award fees on appeal to the prevailing party, despite any alleged deficiencies 
in the briefing. See Van, 147 Idaho at 561, 212 P.3d at 991. As discussed below, an award of 
fees to the prevailing party in a contract claim is mandatory under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). 
Under Atwood v. Western Construction, 129 Idaho 234, 241, 923 P.2d 479, 486 (Ct. App. 1996), 
58 Client:2808598.1 
a wrongful termination claim falls under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). Although PMC argued 
that it was entitled to fees on appeal under section 12-121, it also argued it was entitled to fees 
under section 12-120(3) for prevailing on the contract claims. R. Vol. III 548. "The mandatory 
attorney fee provisions of I. C. § 12-120 govern on appeal as well as in the trial court." Daisy 
Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho 259, 263, 999 P.2d 914, 918 (Ct. App. 2000). 
It is undisputed that an appellate court can affirm a district court decision on any ground 
supported by the record, even if that is not the basis for the district court's decision. McColm-
Traska v. Baker, 139 Idaho 948, 951, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (2004). Here, although the district court 
did not specify a statutory basis for its award of fees on appeal aside from this Court's order, R. 
Vol. III 567-68, it did not abuse its discretion where an award of attorney's fees is appropriate 
under section 12-120(3) based on the successful appeal of the contract claim and this Court's 
order. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's award of fees on appeal. 
V. ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
A. The District Court Erroneously Refused to Award PMC Attorney's Fees Based on 
Being the Prevailing Party on All Claims, Including Prevailing on Summary 
Judgment on Van's Breach of Contract Claim. 
Although the district court recognized that PMC was the prevailing party on all claims, 
including the breach of contract claims, it nonetheless refused to award the attorney's fees to 
which PMC was entitled. Instead of interpreting any ambiguity in this Court's opinion so as to 
be consistent with Idaho law, the court interpreted it narrowly and held that no fees could be 
awarded. R. Vol. III 567-68. Under prevailing Idaho law, PMC is entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees for prevailing on the contract claims on summary judgment. 
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1. Under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), an award of attorney's fees to PMC as 
the prevailing party in a breach of contract claim is mandatory. 
Van's claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing are subject to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). Under that provision, "In any civil action 
to recover on [a] ... contract relating to the purchase or sale of ... services ... , the prevailing 
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and 
collected as costs." IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3). Actions on employment contracts are subject to 
the attorney fee provisions of section 12-120(3), as contracts for services. Jenkins v. Boise 
Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 244, 108 P.3d 380,391 (2005); Atwood v. W Constr., 129 Idaho 
at 241,923 P.2d at 486. For claims within the statute, an award of fees to the prevailing party 
under this section is mandatory. Daisy Mfg. Co., 134 Idaho at 261,999 P.2d at 916; JR. Simp/at 
Co. v. Chemetics Int'l, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 257, 939 P.2d 574,576 (1997). 
"Given the findings by the jury, as well as the Judgment entered by this Court, it is clear 
that PortneufMedical Center is the prevailing party in this civil action, entitled to an award of 
costs." Memorandum Decision, R. Vol. III 557. "Since [PMC] was the prevailing party in this 
employment dispute and it is clear that the gravamen of this case was a contract action, [PMC] 
was entitled to fees associated with the defense of [Van's] contract-related claims." Jenkins, 141 
Idaho at 244, 108 P.3d at 391. On summary judgment, the original district court found that PMC 
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was the prevailing party on the contract claims and awarded $116,983.60 in attorney's fees and 
costs. R. Vol. 12-3,6 
2. This Court's prior opinion did not foreclose the reinstatement of the fees 
awarded to PMC for prevailing on summary judgment. 
This Court's order regarding attorney's fees stated simply: 
The district court's decision is affirmed with regard to Van's contract claims, 
vacated with regard to his Whistleblower Act claim, and remanded for further 
proceedings on the Whistleblower Act claim. The district court's award of 
attorney fees and costs is vacated. We award no costs or attorney fees on appeal. 
The district court may award costs and fees incurred with respect to the appeal to 
the party that prevails on remand. 
Van, 142 Idaho at 562. The order did not specifically preclude the award of fees and costs 
previously awarded by the district court for PMC successfully defending the contract claims. 
Nor did it limit the district court to only awarding fees and costs "on appeal," but instead allowed 
the district court to award costs and fees incurred "with respect to the appeal," a broader term. 
Why would it be necessary to vacate the award of fees and allow the district court to 
determine which party prevailed on remand if the contract claim was not being remanded? The 
answer is in this Court's jurisprudence regarding prevailing parties. In determining which party 
prevailed, the district court must look at the action as a whole, not claim-by-claim. Crump v. 
Bromley, 148 Idaho 172, 174,219 P.3d 1188, 1190 (2009). The prevailing party is determined 
by looking at the action as a whole. 
6 The district court awarded attorney's fees based solely on PMC's prevailing on the contract 
claims, R. Vol. 12-3, not fees related to the Whistleblower claim. PMC does not seek fees for 
time expended on the Whistleblower claim in the trial court. 
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Depending on the outcome on remand, the district court could determine whether both 
parties prevailed in part, one party prevailed, or no party prevailed. Id. Thus, if Van had 
prevailed on the whistleblower claim, and PMC prevailed on the contract claims, the district 
court could have determined that there was no prevailing party in the action as a whole, and 
awarded no fees. Where "both parties are partially successful, it is within the court's discretion 
to decline an award of attorney fees to either side." Id. Or it could have apportioned fees among 
the parties. Thus, it was necessary to vacate the fee award and allow further consideration by the 
district court as to the prevailing party not only on appeal, but in the action as a whole. 
3. The district court abused its discretion by interpreting the prior opinion in a 
way that was contrary to black letter law and reason. 
The district court narrowly interpreted the order and deprived PMC of the mandatory fees 
it was entitled to as the prevailing party on summary judgment under section 12-120(3). After 
considering the language of the order and the parties' arguments, the district court stated: 
Upon careful review of the decision issued by the Idaho Supreme Court, this 
Court takes a narrow view of the orders issued. The Idaho Supreme Court 
entered a limited and specific directive: The district court may award costs and 
fees incurred with respect to the appeal to the party that prevails on remand." 
This Court's authority does not extend to those fees already vacated by the Idaho 
Supreme Court ... the Defendant is not entitled to reimbursement for the costs 
and fees associated with defending against the Plaintiff's breach of contract 
claims. 
R. Vol. III 567-68 (emphasis added). This narrow interpretation was inconsistent with the 
applicable legal standards and contrary to reason, and thus an abuse of discretion. Lee, 146 
Idaho at 10, 189 P.3d at 472. 
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The district court's narrow reading is contrary to precedent; this Court previously rejected 
such a narrow reading of the district court's authority on remand in JR. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics 
International, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 939 P.2d 574 (1997). There, the Court had reversed the 
district court on two counts (in favor ofChemetics), and remanded to the district court "so that 
Simplot's attorney fee award as the prevailing party on Count III may be modified in accordance 
with this opinion." Id. at 257,939 P.2d at 576. On remand, Chemetics sought attorney's fees as 
the prevailing party, but the district court denied the request, determining it did not have 
authority to consider the request. Id. On appeal, this Court noted that "the prevailing party is 
entitled to attorney fees, or an apportionment ofthe fees, pursuant to section 12-120(3) ofthe 
Idaho Code, unless the remand from this Court limited the district court from considering the 
question of the award of costs and fees to Chemetics." Id. Although the remand only 
specifically addressed amending the attorney's fee award to Simplot, not Chemetics, this Court 
held that the "remand did not limit the district court in this regard." Id. Instead, by reversing 
some counts and remanding the case for further consideration, "the question of attorney fees was 
a subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein." Id. at 258; compare Hummer v. Evans, 132 Idaho 
830,833,979 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1999) (no jurisdiction to award fees when court only performed 
"ministerial act" of entering an amended judgment to comply with an appellate decision). 
Accordingly, the district court had jurisdiction to determine "the prevailing party and to make an 
award of costs and attorney fees." JR. Simplot, 130 Idaho at 257, 939 P.2d at 576. 
Here, this Court specifically remanded the case for further proceedings and to award 
costs and fees to the party that prevails on remand. As in JR. Simplot, the court was not 
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perfonning a ministerial act, but had jurisdiction to consider discretionary decisions subsidiary to 
the remand. This is so, even though the Court did not expressly state that the district court was 
to detennine the prevailing party in the action, not just on appeal. However, because 
detennining the prevailing party requires the consideration ofthe action as a whole, and PMC's 
entitlement to attorney's fees for the contract claim on which summary judgment was affinned 
depended on the prevailing party analysis, the district court had authority on remand to reinstate 
the fees awarded on summary judgment. As in JR. Simpiot, the reinstatement of fees was a 
subsidiary issue fairly comprised within the direction to award fees to the prevailing party. 
The district court's decision to interpret this Court's decision and deny fees to the 
prevailing party is contrary to reason, and thus an abuse of discretion. Lee, 146 Idaho at 10, 189 
P.3d at 472. As discussed above, an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party is mandatory 
under section 12-120(3). PMC prevailed on summary judgment on all claims, and was thus 
entitled to fees. This Court affinned the summary judgment on the contract claim, and on 
remand the jury found in favor ofPMC. Thus, PMC was again the prevailing party in respect to 
all claims. It is contrary to reason that PMC, having prevailed on summary judgment and then at 
trial, should be denied attorney's fees simply because there was an intervening appeal. The 
district court's decision to interpret this Court's opinion narrowly so as to deprive PMC of an 
award of fees mandated by the legislature is contrary to reason, and thus an abuse of discretion. 
Therefore, the district court's award of$116,983.60 in attorney's fees should be reinstated. 
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B. PMC Is Entitled to an Award of Costs and Fees on Appeal of This Action Under 
Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-120(3). 
Van's appeal in this case merely asks the Court to second-guess the jury's verdict, is 
frivolous and lacks basis in law or fact, justifying an award of fees on appeal. Under Idaho Code 
Section 12-121, "a party is entitled to attorney's fees if the appeal merely invites the appellate 
court to second guess the trial court on the weight of evidence. Attorney's fees may also be 
awarded ifthe appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation." Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 514,181 P.3d 435,440 (2007). As argued 
above, it is clear that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the 
verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence. The jury heard five weeks of 
testimony, much of it from Van himself, and considered over one hundred exhibits. Despite the 
extraordinary amount of evidence regarding a single claim, the jury required just three hours to 
reach a nearly unanimous verdict in favor ofPMC. 
Van has failed to point to any supposed error in the conduct of the trial that affected a 
substantive right, and more importantly, one that would probably have affected the jury's verdict. 
The supposed errors were either corrected by the court during trial, relevant only to Van's 
damages and thus moot, not preserved on appeal, or harmless because Van failed to object to 
other similar evidence. Thus, Van's appeal ofthe verdict is frivolous and an award of fees is 
appropriate. 
Further, to the extent that this appeal concerns the award of fees because PMC prevailed 
both on summary judgment and on appeal in regard to Van's breach of contract and breach of the 
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, an award of attorney fees is mandatory under 
section 12-120(3). As discussed supra, the prevailing party in a contract action is entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees, including fees on appeal. IfPMC prevails on appeal ofthese issues, 
it should be awarded fees for its appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent/Cross-Appellant respectfully requests this Court 
affirm the judgment ofthe district court as to PMC's liability and the award of costs and 
attorney's fees on appeal, and reinstate the district court's 2008 award of attorney's fees and 
costs for prevailing on summary judgment. 
DATED this 8°~ay of April, 2013. 
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